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INTRODUCTION
Death and taxes may be certain, but tax law's treatment of new medical
technologies is anything but. Nowhere is that more true than in the area of
reproductive technologies. This Article takes stock of the Internal Revenue Code's
(hereinafter "the Code") treatment of emergent reproductive technologies, focusing
upon categorization of elective egg freezing, in order to lay the groundwork for a
more principled approach than the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS") has
mustered thus far. This Article's thesis is that elective egg freezing presents a
conundrum that lays bare the incoherence of the Service's approach to defining costs
for "medical care" that a taxpayer may deduct under the Code.
Elective egg freezing is an emergent reproductive technology. Consider, for
example, the case of Jennifer, a recent law school graduate. She works long hours in
a challenging law firm job that she enjoys. She wants to get married and have
children someday. Recently, a friend mentioned that she was considering freezing
her eggs "just in case."2 Now Jennifer is considering freezing her eggs too. The
procedure may be costly, however, and Jennifer's employer may not cover elective
egg freezing under its primary insurance plan. Some employers have moved to
provide a full subsidy for the extraction and storage of eggs.' But other employers
structure the benefit as a reimbursement arrangement, such as a health
reimbursement arrangement ("HRA"), health savings account ("HSA"), or flexible
spending account ("FSA"). 4 Still other employers provide no egg freezing benefit.
Perhaps Jennifer will consider the tax treatment of these costs, or perhaps not. s
2 Such a scenario is precisely described by some women who pursue egg freezing. See, e.g., Dara
Kerr, Egg Freezing, So Hot Right Now, CNET (May 22, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/egg-freezing-so-hot-right-now/ ("Although Kennedy wasn't really thinking
of getting her eggs frozen, she began to hear lots of buzz around the office as colleagues took advantage
of the benefit. 'It just came up if you were above 30 and single,' Kennedy says."); Heather Murphy, Lots
ofSuccessful Women Are Freezing Their Eggs. ButIt May Not Be About Their Careers, N.Y. TIMES (July
3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/health/fieezing-eggs-women.html [https://perma.cc/XLC3-
A7DJ] ("Instead, most women focused on another reason: they still hadn't found a man to build a family
with.").
3 The Internal Revenue Code provides essential guidance on the tax consequences of
employer-provided care. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 105-106 (2012). Subsection I.B.i discusses specific employers
and their likely rationales for providing such coverage.
4 Exclusion of fluinds reimbursed under an HRA or FSA is dependent upon the expenses qualifying as
medical care under 26 U.S.C. § 213. See IRS, PuB. 969: HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-
FAVORED HEALTH PLANS 2 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p969.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3XL-
RY8M]. For those who incur the costs with no expectation of employer subsidy, the medical care
deduction under § 213 is the only avenue for subsidization. See 26 U.S.C. § 213 (2012). Because the
majority of the reproductive age population falls into one of the latter two groups, the Service's position
on elective egg freezing looms large. See Bruce Lee, Mercer Survey: Health Benefit Cost Growth Slows
to 2.4% in 2016 as Enrollment in High-Deductible Plans Climbs, MERCER (Oct 26, 2016),
https://www.mercer.com/newsroom/national-survey-of-employer-sponsored-health-plans-2016.html
(finding that only five percent of large employers offer some egg-freezing benefit).
s Unless, of course, Jennifer took Income Tax and recalled the discussion of 26 U.S.C. § 213, tax
considerations are unlikely to be at the forefront of her mind as she makes her decision.
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Either way, determining the probable tax treatment of this type of costs presents
vexing questions for tax law and policy.
Vexing because the Service seems of more than one mind when it comes to
emergent reproductive technologies. The Code defines "medical care" as "amounts
paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for
the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body."' Within the broad
outlines that this definition provides, the Service has struggled to categorize fertility
costs.' Sometimes it has viewed fertility costs as disqualified personal expenses, on
the theory that paying for fertility treatments is merely another form of personal
consumption.' Other times the Service has categorized fertility costs as qualifying
medical care.' What the Service has not done is adopt a principled approach. Instead,
its treatment of fertility costs has depended upon ot only the shifting state of medical
knowledge, but also prevailing social norms, marital status, sexual orientation, and
gender of the individual who has paid the fertility costs. "o
How will the Service treat any expenses Jennifer makes for elective egg freezing?
That remains to be seen, but if its approach to fertility costs is any guide-and I will
argue it is-then the Service is unlikely to allow Jennifer to deduct those expenses.
In reaching that result, however, the Service will have to confront its shallow and
inconsistent understanding of preventative care under the Code. Section 213 clearly
defines "medical care" to include preventative care. And, therefore, § 213 of the
Code allows a taxpayer to deduct the costs of preventative care. For instance, a
taxpayer may deduct the costs of an annual physical as "medical care," even if the
individual does not have a medical condition at the time of the exam." Jennifer's
costs of elective egg freezing may plausibly, even easily, qualify as preventative care
under § 213, or so I shall also argue. 12 For the Service to conclude that elective egg
6 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
See Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1121, 1139 (2004) ("The characterization of some fertility treatment expenses as § 213 medical
expenses is unsettled.").
'See Tessa Davis, Reproducing Value: How Tax Law Differentially Values Fertility, Sexuality &
Marriage, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 1, 12-13 (2012) (discussing the IRS's position "that surrogacy
expenses do not qualify as medical expenses under Section 213.").
9 See id at 12 (summarizing the IRS's stance that treatments aimed at overcoming an inability to have
children qualify as a medical expense).
o See Anthony C Infanti, Dismembering Families, in CHALLENGING GENDER INEQUALITY IN TAX
POLICY MAKING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 173-74 (Kim Brooks et al. eds., 2011); Katherine Pratt,
Deducting the Costs ofFertility Treatment: Implications ofMagdalin v. Commissioner For Opposite-Sex
Couples, Gay and Lesbian Same-Sex Couples, and Single Women and Men, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 1283,
1335 (2009) (noting that "legal rules can be conceptualized as a site for the enforcement and reproduction
of legal norms.").
" See IRS, PUB. 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 12 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V65-XXHR].
12 For information on the type of preventative care readily qualified as medical care, see Women's
Preventive Services Initiative, ACOG, https://www.acog.org/About-ACOG/ACOG-
Departments/Annual-Womens-Health-Care/Womens-Preventive-Services-Initiative
[https://perma.cc/NW6D-L5AL] (detailing guidelines of recommended screenings and preventive health
services for women); Ages 19-39 Years: Exams and Screening Tests, ACOG,
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freezing is not preventative would thus further complicate its already complicated
categorization of expenses under § 213.
Elective egg freezing, after all, is neither traditional fertility care nor
traditional preventive care. Unlike traditional fertility care, in which an individual or
couple seeks to have a child in the present, elective egg freezing is about delaying
reproduction until some later date.13 It seeks, in other words, to prevent the loss of
the ability to reproduce that comes with growing older. Yet unlike traditional
preventative care, elective egg freezing does not aim to prevent a condition that we
typically think of as a "disease."4 Nor does it aim to prevent a condition that an
individual might develop. Instead, it hedges against a condition that is a natural and
certain result of the passage of time. It aims to prevent the end result of infertility in
the future. As such, it is a nontraditional form of preventative care.
In exploring the complexities that elective egg freezing presents, this Article
makes four contributions to the literature on tax policy and medical care. The first
contribution is analytical. This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of the tax
law implications of elective egg freezing. It considers how best to categorize elective
egg freezing in light of § 213 and the Service's existing approaches. This
comprehensive evaluation of elective egg freezing lays a foundation for future
doctrinal development. "
The second contribution, therefore, is doctrinal: This Article explores the Code's
definition of "preventative care" from a new vantage. It seeks to clarify the category
of preventative care and to better distinguish its role within § 213. The Service's
precedent is unclear as to whether-and when-reproductive care is too bound up
with the general health and well-being of the individual to qualify as deductible
https://www.acog.org/About-ACOG/ACOG-Departments/Annual-Womens-Health-Care/FOR-
PATIENTS/Pt-Exams-and-Screening-Tests-Age-19-39-Years [https://perma.cc/TPX3-2G77]; Key
Statistics for Ovarian Cancer, AM. CANCER Soc'Y (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/ovarian-cancer/about/key-statistics.html [https://perma.cc/3RW2-9AZE]
(explaining that a woman has less than a 2% chance of developing ovarian cancer during her lifetime.);
Breast Cancer Risk in American Women, NAT'L. CANCER INST. (Sept 24, 2012),
https://www.cancer.gov/types/breast/risk-fact-sheet [h tps://perma.cc/HR6F-ZCQB] (stating that women
have about a 12% chance of developing breast cancer during their lifetime).
" Elective egg freezing is also, arguably, connected to a robust and controversial area of tax literature:
the tax treatment of human capital acquisition costs. When a woman delays reproduction to pursue
education, develop her career, or find a partner she is, at least in part, doing so to develop her own human
capital. While this view is fascinating, this Article does not delve into the human capital discussion, but
rather analyzes it as the Service is likely to do.
1 It is because there is no disease present that elective gg freezing, and other similar emergent
technologies, likely fall outside the mitigation language of § 213. See 26 U.S.C. § 213 (2012); infra Parts
II, III.
i The likelihood of this question reaching the Service in the near future is high due to the high costs
of care, which may surmount the § 213 Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) threshold, and the sparse coverage
of such costs. Further, increasing numbers of women are utilizing elective egg freezing services. Ariana
Eunjung Cha, The Struggle to Conceive with Frozen Eggs, WASH. PosT, (Jan. 27, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/01/27/feature/.she-championed-the-idea-that-
freezing-your-eggs-would-free-your-career-but-things-didnt-quite-work-out/?utmterm=.3 1 ca52 1bf364
(citing a Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology survey that found the number of women freezing
their eggs increased from 475 in 2009 to nearly 8,000 in 2015).
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medical care. In exploring this precedent, and applying it to elective egg freezing,
this Article clarifies the lack of rigor in the medical care category broadly, and the
preventative care precedent specifically, emphasizing its implications for elective
egg freezing.
This Article's third contribution is critical. In particular, this Article builds upon
my prior work to critique the Service's treatment of fertility costs. Therein, I argued
that the Service failed to recognize the culturally-contingent nature of terms such as
"normal" or "natural" reproduction. 1 That failure, explains, at least in part, the
Service's struggles in applying section 213 to fertility care. This Article's critical
contribution extends beyond the treatment of fertility costs, however. In particular,
I lay a foundation for future work on the incoherence of the Service's use of
"personal choice" to distinguish deductible medical costs from non-deductible
personal consumption. The Service's definition of preventative care displays this
incoherence, as it appeals to the idea that the presence of personal choice disqualifies
much preventative care, while ignoring or understating the role of personal choice in
a wide swath of qualifying medical care.
Fourth, and finally, this Article contributes to the analysis of the tax implications
of other emergent medical technologies. I argue that elective egg freezing is
analogous to many emerging medical technologies. It thus presents a particularly
important litmus test for how the Service will employ concepts like "choice,"
"consumption," and "preventative care," among others, in addressing a wide array
of tax policy questions. In particular, I argue that how the Service approaches elective
egg freezing may determine the future classifications of state-of-the-art medical
technologies such as prophylactic surgery and gene therapy.
This Article unfolds in four Parts. Part I provides background on elective egg
freezing by describing the technology and contextualizing its use, both of which are
important factors in a tax analysis. Part II addresses the relevant tax precedent. Part
III, the heart of the Article, applies the tax precedent to elective egg freezing,
showing how this test case lays bare the incoherence of the Service's analytical
approach. Part IV concludes by connecting Part M's analysis to broader questions
of the definition of "medical care" and its application to emerging medical
technologies.
I. NEW FRONTIERS: ELECTIVE EGG FREEZING
Elective egg freezing-sometimes referred to as social egg freezing"-is an
emergent medical technology in two important ways. The technology itself is only
newly-approved for widespread use and continues to develop. Assuming the reader
1 Davis, supra note 8, at 1-2, 12.
1 See, e.g., Angel Petropanagos, Reproductive 'Choice' and Egg Freezing, in ONCOFERTtLITY:
ETHICAL, LEGAL, SOCIAL AND MEDICAL PERSPECTIVES 223 (Teresa K. Woodruff et al. eds., 2010) ("As
oocyte and ovarian tissue cryopreservation techniques continue to improve, there is a growing need to
address the moral permissibility ofwhat has been called 'social' egg freezing." (endnotes omitted)); Angel
Petropanagos et al., Social Egg Freezing: Risk, Benefits and Other Considerations, 187 CMAJ 666,
666-69 (2015) (evaluating the phenomenon of social egg freezing).
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is unfamiliar with the area, this Part details the procedure. But elective egg freezing
is an emergent echnology in another critical way: the social context of its provision
and use. Why women use elective egg freezing, why employers provide coverage,
and how clinics market the care should shape policy responses to its use. For tax law
and policy, this social context makes situating elective egg freezing within the
existing § 213 framework challenging and exposes the weaknesses therein. Because
the social context of elective egg freezing is important to its analysis, this Part
explores that context, providing the necessary foundation for the tax analysis of
subsequent parts.
In late 2016, Extend Fertility opened the nation's first fertility clinic offering only
elective egg freezing services." Rather than acting as a full-service infertility clinic,
this Manhattan clinic expressly targets women interested in delaying pregnancy by
protecting fertility through elective egg freezing." Clinic materials distinguish the
Manhattan practice from other, more comprehensive, clinics:
We recognize that the physical and emotional needs of women
interested in fertility options are vastly different from the needs of women
struggling with infertility issues. This might seem obvious. But most
practices serve both sets of women in the same office and focus mainly
on the latter, who hope to get pregnant immediately through techniques
like in vitro fertilization (IVF)-which is efficient for the practice, but not
ideal for you if you're not in that camp.
That's what's different about Extend Fertility: we believe that women
interested in fertility options for the future deserve the same level of
service, emotional support, and physician excellence as women trying for
a baby now.
What's new about Extend Fertility is our focus on creating a program
centered around the unique, busy lives of women who want to freeze their
eggs-at a price that makes sense at this point in their lives.....
Every woman has her own dreams and aspirations. And for many,
setting aside the worry about fertility can help them focus on achieving
18 See About Extend Fertility, EXTEND FERTILITY, https://extendfertility.com/about-us
[https://perma.cc/VK4F-G2NR] ("Extend Fertility is the very first service in the U.S. dedicated
exclusively to women choosing to proactively freeze their eggs."). As a company, Extend Fertility has
been in the fertility business for over a decade but the Midtown West, New York clinic is the first clinic
dedicated exclusively to egg freezing. See id.; Nicole Pesce, Oh Baby: First Egg Freezing-Only Clinic
Opens in Manhattan with $5,000 Deal, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 10, 2016),
http://www.nydailynews.com/Iife-style/health/egg-freezing-only-clinic-opens-nyc-5-000-deal-article-
1.2745758 [https://perma.cc/6TPV-DFLF]. Though other providers, such as NYU Langone, have
provided egg freezing services since 2004, Extend Fertility is unique in its move to sever elective egg
freezing from traditional fertility care. Egg Freezing & Embryo Banking, NYU LANGONE HEALTH,
https://nyulangone.org/locations/fertility-center/egg-freezing-embryo-banking [https://perma.ccIYJ28-
DNHR]; Sally Wadyka, For Women Worried About Fertility, Egg Bank Is a New Option, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept 21, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/21/health/for-women-worried-about-fertility-egg-
bank-is-a-new-option.html [https://perma.cc/E9YR-VDSM].
" See Pesce, supra note 18.
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their goals. If that's the case for you, come talk to us to learn more about
Extend Fertility. We're here to help.20
The promise of Extend Fertility, then, is not resolving the discrete medical
condition of diagnosed infertility, but instead is that a woman can buy time-ime to
find a partner, time to develop her career, time to spend childfree without losing her
ability to have children. It is a tantalizing but controversial promise.21
A. Technology and Process
Considered experimental until 2012, mature oocyte cryopreservation
(colloquially egg freezing) remains a controversial technology.22 The process is
invasive, costly, and its chances of success-of leading to a future child-are
unclear.23 Though elective egg freezing may have complicated impacts on women's
equality, interpersonal relationships, and employment, the process itself is easy to
describe. 24 To prepare, a woman consults a reproductive endocrinologist to
determine if she is a good candidate for egg freezing.25 If she is a good candidate,
the woman will begin the first of three separate phases. First, the woman will undergo
daily hormone injections for a little over one week. 26 The drugs used-a
"stimulator", an "antagonist", and a "trigger"-cause the woman's body to produce
20 About Extend Fertility, supra note 18 (emphasis added).
21 This Part will address the criticisms of elective egg freezing. One is worth noting here, however,
and that is that employers are offering to subsidize elective egg freezing for their own benefit-to recruit,
retain, and extract more hours from employees by subsidizing their delaying having children. This
criticism raises a fascinating question as to whether an employer-provided elective egg freezing is not
compensation because the primary benefit accrues to the employer. This Article focuses on the
categorization of elective egg freezing under § 213 and only opines on the compensation issue.
22 See Jon Bardin, Freezing ofHuman Eggs No Longer an Experimental Procedure, L.A. TIMES (Oct.
19, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/19/news/la-heb-freezing-of-human-eggs-no-longer-
experimental-20121019 [https://perma.cc/EGR7-CKQG]; Ruth La Ferla, These Companies Really,
Really, Really Want to Freeze Your Eggs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/style/egg-freezing-fertility-millennials.html [https://perma.cc/G4RD-
ZPPL].
23 See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Social Egg Freezing Is a Numbers Game That Many Women Don't
Understand, WASH. POsT (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-
health/wp/2018/01/29/social-egg-freezing-is-a-numbers-game-that-many-women-dont-
understand/?utm_term=.d9b3493d6507 [https://perma.cc/NN7N-43JM]; Cha, supra note 15.
24 The focus of this Article is not exploring whether elective egg freezing is "good" as a matter of
policy. That it should qualify as medical care is a doctrinal rather than a policy position.
25 
AM. SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED., CAN I FREEZE MY EGGS TO USE LATER IF I'M NOT SICK? 1 (2014),
http://www.reproductivefacts.org/globalassets/rf/news-and-publications/bookletsfact-sheets/english-
fact-sheets-and-info-booklets/can i freeze my eggs to-uselaterifimnotsickfactsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3UXT-YXKC]. Age plays an important part in this analysis though some studies have
considered cost-effectiveness as well. Tolga B. Mesen et al., Optimal Timing for Elective Egg Freezing,
103 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1551 (2015) ("Oocyte cryopreservation can be of great benefit to specific
women and has the highest chance of success when performed at an earlier age.").
26 See Your Egg Freezing Cycle, EXTEND FERTILITY, https://extendfertility.com/our-process/your-
egg-freezing-cycle [https://perma.cc/9BLK-ULKP].
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more eggs (the stimulator) and then control the release (the antagonist and the
trigger).27 Throughout the hormone stimulation phase, a woman regularly visits her
doctor for blood tests and/or ultrasounds to evaluate the efficacy of the hormone
treatments.28 At the close of the hormone stimulation phase, the woman is ready for
the second phase: egg retrieval.
Egg retrieval is an outpatient procedure. 29 At this stage, an ultrasound is
performed to locate the ovaries and confirm the presence of the eggs to be
harvested. 30 To retrieve the eggs, an anesthesiologist provides an intravenous
anesthetic." Another physician then extracts the eggs from the woman's ovaries,
passing a catheterized needle through the vaginal wall to do so.3 2 The woman then
remains in the office until the anesthesia wears off and she can safely return to her
day." While the woman recovers, clinic staff transfers her eggs to test tubes for a
flash-freezing process known as vitrification.34 Because freezing twenty to thirty
eggs increases the chances of eventual successful fertilization and implantation, a
woman may undergo as many as four or five rounds of ovarian hormonal stimulation
and egg retrieval.3 5
Unsurprisingly, egg freezing is expensive.36 Though numbers vary across clinics,
the average costs are instructive. A woman can anticipate paying at least $10,000 per
27 Id. The drugs commonly used are:
Gonal-F or Follistim (follicle stimulating hormone), used to stimulate egg production[;]
Menopur, a combination hormonal medication (follicle stimulating hormone and luteinizing
hormone), also used to stimulate egg production[;] Ganirelix Acetate or Cetrotide, medications
used to prevent premature release of the eggs before you're ready for your egg retrieval
procedure[;] Lupron (also known as leuprolide acetate), a type of 'trigger' medication used to
initiate the final egg maturation before the retrieval and freezing[; and,] hCG (human chorionic
gonadotropin), also sold as Ovidrel or Novarel, an alternative kind of 'trigger' medication.
Medrcations, EXTENDFERTHIIY, https//extendfertility.com/facts-figures/nedications [https//permacc/R6FA-DF6L].
28 AM. SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 25.
29 Id.; see also The Egg Retrieval Process, EXTEND FERTILITY, https://extendfertility.com/our-
process/the-egg-retrieval [https://perma.cc/9JCJ-9JRN].
30 See The Egg Retrieval Process, supra note 29.
31 Id.
32 Id.
13 Though the procedure is outpatient, clinics recommend a woman rest for the balance of the day
after the procedure. See id.
3 Id.; Frequently Asked Questions About Egg Freezing, USC FERTILITY, http://uscfertility.org/egg-
freezing-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/7PHX-N4T9].
3s See Cost of Freezing Eggs, SHADY GROVE FERTILITY, httpsj/www.shadygrovefertilitycom/affording-
carelegg-fieezing-cost/cost-friezing-eggs [https//perma.cc/3WHM-G5TQ].
3 Infertility and reproductive health organizations compile information on state law and insurance
coverage for infertility care. There is less information available on elective egg freezing. See Infertility
Coverage by State, RESOLVE, https://resolve.org/what-are-my-options/insurance-coverage/infertility-
coverage-state/ [https://perma.cc/C6EB-UG2R]; RI Becomes First State to Explicitly Require Coverage
of Fertility Preservation for At-Risk Patients, Women & Infants (July 31, 2017),
http://www.womenandinfants.org/news/fertility-preservation-legislation.cfmn [https://perma.cc/CX9X-
UHAJ] (Noting that Rhode Island became the first state to require coverage for egg freezing in 2017 but
only prior to medical treatment that could lead to infertility); Michelle Andrews, Few Employers
Cover Egg Freezing for Women with Cancer, NPR (Dec. 16, 2014, 8:22 AM),
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round of care.37 That cost does not include the required hormone treatments which
add an additional $3,000 to $5,000.31 Thereafter, a woman will pay approximately
$500 annually for storage.3 9 The final significant cost comes when the woman
decides to use her frozen eggs, at which point she will incur the costs of in vitro
fertilization which averages $20,000 per round.4o Assuming a woman undergoes two
rounds of the process and stores her eggs for ten years, she will have incurred
approximately $20,000 to $30,000 in up-front costs and another $5,000 to $10,000
for storage, hardly insignificant sums.
Until recently, egg freezing was utilized in conjunction with another medical
procedure.41 For example, a woman would freeze her eggs during the process of her
infertility treatment or after a cancer diagnosis, but before radiation or
chemotherapy. 4 2 Only after the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
removed the experimental label from egg freezing in 2012 did the procedure begin
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014/12/16/37100991 1/few-employers-cover-egg-freezin.
for-women-with-cancer [https://perma.cc/S27G-DDDC].
" James Hamblin, One Clinic Is Promising to Cut the Cost ofEgg Freezing in Half ATLANTIC (Sept.
15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/09/how-one-clinic-is-cutting-the-cost-of-
egg-freezing-in-half/500144/ [https://perma.cc/JD8X-X5EA] (criticizing Extend Fertility's cost-saving
claims as little more than deceptive price structures). Notably, some clinics offer discounts for multiple
rounds of freezing. See Patti Neighmond, Women Can Freeze Their Eggs for the Future, But at a Cost,
NPR (Oct. 16, 2014, 5:19 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2014/10/16/356727823/freezing-a-womans-eggs-can-be-emotionally-and-fmancially-costly
[https://perma.cc/X2SP-GVST]; Cost of Freezing Eggs, supra note 35.
" Sarah McHaney & Rebecca Jacobson, 7 Things Every Woman Should Know Before Freezing Her
Eggs, PBS (Dec. 10, 2014, 1:09 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/freeze-eggs/
[https://perma.cc/464K-UKPH].
" Neighmond, supra note 37; see also Charlotte Cowles, Is Freezing My Eggs Worth the Cost?, CUT
(Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/08/egg-freezing-clinics-cost.html
[https://perma.cc/7RMP-UNAM] ("[S]torage fess to keep your eggs safely frozen ... can be anywhere
from $350 for a long-term plan to $1,500 annually.").
' Jennifer Gerson Uffalussy, The Cost of IVF: 4 Things I Learned While Battling Infertility, FORBES
(Feb. 6, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leamvest/2014/02/06/the-cost-of-ivf-4-things-i-
learned-while-battling-infertility/#4316907124dd [https://perma.cc/F538-K3L5] (providing an average
cost that includes required medications).
41 Of course, there is an element of choice when a woman with a cancer diagnosis decides to preserve
fertility by freezing her eggs. However, such a decision is arguably compelled, in large part, by the cancer
diagnosis. And that fact is critical for the § 213 analysis because it: (1) situates the egg freezing within the
context of the treatment of the cancer, satisfying the disease prong of § 213 and (2) because the cancer
drives the risk of infertility, its presence minimizes the likelihood of the Service arguing that the care was
pursued due to the personal choice of the taxpayer. See 26 U.S.C. § 213.
42 See Egg Freezing, MAYO CLINIC, (Feb. 1, 2019), http//www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/egg-
freezing/details/why-its-done/iec-20168995 [httpsJ/perma~cc/V2TY-PVYL]. Egg freezing might also be part of a
treatment protocol for childhood cancers in hopes of preserving the child's future fertility. Described as "fertility
preservation," egg freezing might be used in the context of treatment of other diseases or conditions as well, including
endometriosis, gender transition, or ovary removal. See Female Fertility Preservation Is an OptionforManyMedical
Conditions, USC FERTILITY, http-//isefertility.org/ferility-preservation/female-fertility-preservation-medical-
reasons/ [https://penna.cc/JXE4-52YZ].
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to move into the realm of elective egg freezing.4 3 Between 2012 and 2013, the
number of women who used egg freezing increased by over 60%." Comparing 2009
to 2015 shows an even more dramatic increase of 1600%.45 Though the numbers are
still low--under 10,000 annually-the trend is toward increasing use of the
technology.4 6 Indeed, reports indicate that women may be traveling to the United
States from other countries to undergo the process.47 In short, egg freezing is an
emerging and increasingly popular form of care.
B. Framing the Use ofElective Egg Freezing
Elective egg freezing differs from the first uses of the technology, not in
substance but in the social context of its use. A woman who chooses to freeze her
eggs absent a diagnosis of infertility or need for treatment that may harm her fertility
simply hedges against the risk of future infertility. Stated differently, she is engaging
in highly-medicalized preventative care. The employer who decides to subsidize
elective egg freezing has a different set of motivations. Because the woman's and
the employer's motivations in using or subsidizing elective egg freezing may come
to bear on its classification for tax purposes,4 8 this Section explores both.
i. Why Employers Offer an Elective Egg Freezing Benefit
Early in 2016, the Department of Defense49 joined tech giants Facebook and
Apple s in offering coverage for the costs of egg freezing. More employers
43 Eliza Barclay, More Women Are Freezing Their Eggs, But Will They Ever Use Them?, NPR (Nov.
24, 2015, 5:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/11/24/456671203/more-women-are-
freezing-their-eggs-but-will-they-ever-use-them [https://perma.cc/9LNW-55BW].
4 This is according to statistics from the Society for Assisted Reproduction, but it is unclear whether
these numbers are limited to social egg freezing. See id. Clinics in the UK have seen a similar rise in egg
freezing. See Laura Donnelly, Number of Women Freezing Their Eggs Triples in Just Five Years,
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 23, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/23/number-of-women-
freezing-their-eggs-triples-in-just-five-years/ [https://perma.cc/W2U8-MUXR].
* Cha, supra note 15.
"See La Ferla, supra note 22 (noting that industry expert Gina Bartasi, the former chief executive at
fertility benefits company Progyny, estimates that 76,000 women may freeze their eggs in 2018);
Carolyn Zhang, Chinese Women Head Overseas to Freeze Their Eggs, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/world/asia/china-us-women-fertility.html?
[https://perma.cc/N4U4-HEMM] (noting that 7,000 egg-freezing cycles occurred in the U.S. in 2014).
47 Zhang, supra note 46 (detailing Chinese healthcare tourism to the U.S.). Of course, use of egg
freezing technology by overseas taxpayers does not directly bear on domestic tax consequences. But to
the extent that such use further normalizes elective egg freezing, it may increase the uptake by U.S.
taxpayers.
4 See infra Part III.
49 Natalie Lampert, New Fertility Options for Female Soldiers, ATLANTIC (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/02/fertility-women-soldiers/471537/
[https://perma.cc/J3JJ-CPGB].
o Christina Farr, Apple, Facebook Will Pay for Female Employees to Freeze Their Eggs, REUTERS
(Oct. 14, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-fertility-idUSKCNOI32KQ20141014
[https://perma.cc/CK4L-DX2M].
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followed."' As of mid-2017, more than a dozen tech companies provided an egg
freezing benefit, including Netflix, Spotify, Google, Uber, and Yahoo! .52 Details of
how each company provides the benefit are hard to acquire, but some consistencies
emerge.s" This Article analyzes both of two basic benefit structures: inclusion of egg
freezing as a covered benefit under the primary employer-provided health insurance
plan and coverage via employer reimbursement for medical costs through a medical
expense account or reimbursement program, such as an HRA, HSA, or FSA. The
specific form of the benefit and its amount impact the tax consequences, as will be
addressed in Part III.
Employer motivation in providing a benefit matters. Employer motivation helps
determine whether a transfer to an employee is income, for example.54 At the
intersection of § 213 and elective egg freezing, employer motivation shapes the
social context of the use of the care. Social context, in turn, plays a role in the tax
analysis of categorization under § 213, as will be explored later in this Part and in
Part Ell. Though the number of employers that have made public statements on why
they are subsidizing elective egg freezing is limited, those that have focus on the
notion of empowerment." In an interview with Bloomberg, Virgin Group CEO
Richard Branson scoffed at the notion that someone should be criticized for using or
providing elective egg freezing."6 He stated simply: "it's women's choice" as to
when and with whom she wants to a have a child." In the same interview, COO of
Facebook Sheryl Sandberg characterized the decision to support elective egg
freezing as consistent with its offering broad "benefits for all life stages."s Apple's
public statement strikes a similar tone:
s' See Jake Anderson-Bialis et al., The Best Companies to Work For as a Fertility Patient:
2016-2017 Rankings, FERTILITY IQ https://www.fertilityiq.com/cost/2016-best-companies-to-work-for-
as-a-fertility-patient-corporate-fertility-benefits-rankings [https://perma.cc/N2H9-T6R2] (listing and
ranking employers based upon the availability of infertility benefits).
52 See Kerr, supra note 2.
" I reached out to companies that had publicly acknowledged the availability of an elective egg
freezing benefit to determine how the benefit is provided but received no response.
s To be clear, most transfers from an employer to employee raise no real interpretive challenges. An
employer benefits from paying wages to an employee in so far as the employer retains the employee and
receives the employee's efforts, but there is no question that the wages have a compensatory motive and
are, therefore, income. Some v xing cases emerge, however. For examples, see Comm'r v. Kowalski, 434
U.S. 77, 83-84 (1977) and United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1968), two important
cases in the area. Herein, the structure of an elective egg freezing benefit raises no real doubt as to the
compensatory motive.
55 
See, e.g., Sandberg, BransonDefendFacebook's Egg-Freezing Policy, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24,2015,
8:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-04-24/sandberg-branson-defend-facebook-s-
egg-freezing-policy [https://perma.cc/5HQD-7WH2].
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. Sandberg noted that the initial decision to consider covering egg freezing came after an
employee wanted to freeze her eggs ahead of a cancer diagnosis. Id. She then suggested that there should
be no distinction between egg freezing in this more traditional scenario and one in which a woman chooses
to do so with age-related fertility decline in mind. Id.; see also Danielle Friedman, Perk Up: Facebook
and Apple Now Pay for Women to Freeze Eggs, NBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2014, 2:56 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/perk-facebook-apple-now-pay-women-freeze-eggs-n2250 11
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Apple cares deeply about our employees and their families, and we
are always looking at new ways our health programmes can meet their
needs. We continue to expand our benefits for women, with a new
extended maternity leave policy, along with cyropreservation and egg
storage as part of our extensive support for infertility treatments ... We
want to empower women at Apple to do the best work of their lives as
they care for loved ones and raise their families.59
Employers' framing of elective egg freezing closely tracks that of the elective egg
freezing industry itself; elective egg freezing is, it seeis, about empowering
women to be in control of their personal and professional ives.
Critics question the empowerment narrative." Rather than meaningful support,
skeptics view provision of the benefit as stemming from one of three motives: first,
the desire to retain female talent in male-dominated industries plagued by gender
inequity;62 second, the desire to encourage women to delay childbearing for the
benefit of the employer;3 or third, as a distraction from meaningful, pro-work/life
[https://perma.cc/Q2BR-3YHD] ("News of the firms' egg-freezing coverage comes in the midst of what's
been described as a Silicon Valley 'perks arms race.' It's only the latest in a generous list of family and
wellness-oriented health benefits from Apple and Facebook (whose COO, of course, is feminist change
agent and 'Lean In' author Sheryl Sandberg). Both companies offer benefits for fertility treatment and
adoption. Facebook famously gives new parents $4,000 in so-called 'baby cash' to use however they'd
like.").
" Mark Tran, Apple and Facebook Offer to Freeze Eggs for Female Employees, GuARDIAN (Oct. 15,
2014, 4:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/15/apple-facebook-offer-freeze-
eggs-female-employees [https://perma.cc/5REQ-GZ7C] (omission in original).
'0 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 58 ("Companies may be concerned about the public relations
implications of the benefit-in the most cynical light, egg-freezing coverage could be viewed as a ploy to
entice women to sell their souls to their employer, sacrificing childbearing years for the promise of
promotion.").
62 See, e.g., id. ("With notoriously male-dominated Silicon Valley firms competing to attract top
female talent, the coverage may give Apple and Facebook a leg up among the many women who devote
key childbearing years to building careers. Covering egg freezing can be viewed as a type of 'payback'
for women's commitment, said Philip Chenette, a fertility specialist in San Francisco."); Kerr, supra note
2 ("[Tech companies are] also under pressure to attract more female employees to their mostly male
workforces.").
6 3 See, e.g., Kelly Phillips Erb, Apple Seeds Perk Wars, Adds Egg Freezing as Employee Benefit,
FORBES (Oct. 17, 2014, 8:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/10/17/apple-
seeds-perk-wars-adds-egg-freezing-as-employee-benefit/#4fc7b2e4174d [https://perma.cc/YDW2-
RB4T] ("Companies say they're just giving female employees what they want but it's not unlikely that
there's a more selfish reason: keeping female employees at their jobs a little longer."); Friedman, supra
note 58("Will the perk pay off for companies? The benefit will likely encourage women to stay with their
employer longer, cutting down on recruiting and hiring costs. And practically speaking, when women
freeze their eggs early, firms may save on pregnancy costs in the long run, said Westphal. A woman could
avoid paying to use a donor egg down the road, for example, or undergoing more intensive fertility
treatments when she's ready to have a baby. But the emotional and cultural payoff may be more valuable,
said Jones: Offering this benefit 'can help women be more productive human beings."').
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balance reforms, such as flexible work schedules or parental leave.' As one
commentator cautioned: "When you're in a situation of your employer offering you
a choice, you really have to be careful that you're distinguishing between something
that's an expanded option and something that's actually subtle or even explicit
pressure to do what your employer wants you to do."'
A healthy skepticism of employer motivations seems appropriate and the
implications of elective egg freezing for gender equality, employer-employee
relations, family policy, wealth inequality, and women's health should be explored
across disciplines." While presumably employers have different motivations for
subsidizing egg freezing," this Article assumes, consistent with the structure of the
benefits and relevant doctrine, that any employer benefit for elective egg freezing is
compensatory. 6 The inquiry then becomes how § 213 applies to elective egg
freezing and the weaknesses of current doctrine that such inquiry exposes. How
women use elective egg freezing is an important part of that analysis.
64 See, e.g., Samantha Allen, Don't Be Fooled by Apple and Facebook, Egg Freezing Isn't Cool,
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 17, 2014, 5:48 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/dont-be-fooled-by-apple-and-
facebook-egg-freezing-isnt-cool [https://perma.cc/RMJ7-UX8M] ("In this context, the decision to cover
egg freezing reads as Silicon Valley at its most typical, deploying a hasty technological stopgap for a
cultural problem.... [I]t is telling that these top tech firms have opted to splurge on a measure that seems
to be targeted at delaying childbirth among female employees before adopting even more measures to
accommodate women who have children early in or midway through their careers.").
65 Laura Sydell, Silicon Valley Companies Add New Benefit for Women: Egg-Freezing, NPR (Oct.
17, 2014 3:21 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/10/17/35 6765423/silicon-
valley-companies-add-new-benefit-for-women-egg-freezing [https://perna.cc/W8B3-8TZL] ("But
Marcy Darnovsky, executive director at the Center for Genetics and Society, says that expanding benefits
to cover egg-freezing could put pressure on women to delay childbearing so that their employer can get
more hours out of them. Darnovsky is an advocate for the responsible use of reproductive technologies.").
6 That work has already begun. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Gender/Class Divide:
Reproduction, Privilege, and the Workplace, 8 FLA. INT'L U. L. REv. 287 (2013); Imogen Goold & Julian
Savulescu, In Favour ofFreezing Eggs for Non-Medical Reasons, 23 BIoETtHcs 47, 52-57 (2009); Karey
Harwood, Egg Freezing: A Breakthrough for Reproductive Autonomy?, 23 BIOETHICS 39 (2009); Ann C.
McGinley, Subsidized Egg Freezing in Employment: Autonomy, Coercion, or Discrimination?, 20 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 331 (2016); Petropanagos, supra note 17, at 223-24.
67 Employers should nevertheless be cautious when providing egg freezing as a benefit. See Erb,
supra note 63 ("What this means is that employers must tread lightly when contemplating nontraditional
benefits. While it may be advantageous to think out of the box, a number of issues are raised when it
comes to offering these kinds of benefits to employees including privacy concerns and whether it's a 'fair'
perk to offer when only a small percentage of employees may take advantage of it. When it comes to egg
freezing, for example, women who opt not to take advantage of the perk may worry how that decision
will be regarded: are they sending a message that they are not willing to put their career ahead of family?
What about men who opt not to share the benefit with a spouse? Typically, employees don't discuss their
plans for family with an employer but taking advantage of this kind of benefit - or opting out - may signal
your intentions.").
68 Whether there is a theoretical argument that the employer motivations in covering elective egg
freezing call into doubt if such coverage should be understood as compensatory is a fascinating discussion
for another day.
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ii. Why Women Use Elective Egg Freezing
Despite the increasing availability of employer coverage, the majority of working
women have no employer-provided coverage of elective egg freezing.69 Thus, many
women who undergo elective gg freezing do so without expectation of an employer
subsidy.70 The only potential, partial subsidy available to this group is, then, a
deduction for the costs of egg freezing under § 213.71 Whether a woman utilizes an
employer benefit or self-pays, however, her reasons for undergoing egg freezing
influence the tax classification of the care.7 2 Understanding women's motivations for
seeking such care is, therefore, important to determining the tax treatment of elective
egg freezing costs.
Egg freezing clinics strongly promote the idea that egg freezing gives women
control; control of their careers, control of their personal lives, and control of their
bodies.3 Clinics hail that elective egg freezing enables a couple to "circumvent
age-related [fertility] limitations."' Extend Fertility promises that "[p]utting your
eggs on ice will give you more flexibility and freedom for your future.",7 The
University of North Carolina's fertility clinic notes that education and career may
mean that "[t]he 'right time' for a woman to become pregnant does not always align
with her biological clock" and that egg freezing pauses that clock. 6 Echoed by
employers' rhetoric on elective egg freezing, clinics emphasize the language of
choice, empowerment, and control.
Women are increasingly receptive to the promises of elective egg freezing. The
common threads of women's reasons for using elective egg freezing map well onto
the marketing claims of the clinics themselves. Women cite feelings of freedom and
increased choice in and control over their personal lives and careers as motivators to
" See Kerr, supra note 2 (stating that only around 5% of companies with 500+ employees offer an
egg freezing benefit).
7o See Friedman, supra note 58 ("[T]he more likely explanation for lack of coverage is simply that
egg freezing is still new, and conversation around the procedure has only recently gone mainstream."); cf
Clare O'Connor, Carrot Fertility Raises $3.6M to Help Take IVF, Egg Freezing Benefits Mainstream,
FORBES (Sept. 14, 2017, 8:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2017/09/14/carrot-
fertility-raises-3-6m-to-help-take-ivf-egg-freezing-benefits-mainstream/#27935efl517e
[https://perma.cc/G24X-4YQB] (discussing a startup attempting to make egg freezing more accessible to
smaller companies and female employees).
71 See discussion infra Part III.
72 See discussion infra Part III.
7 See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Egg Freezing, Stratified Reproduction and the Logic of Not, 2 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES 112, 113 (Feb. 2015) (discussing the targeting of specific groups of women and the branding
of the procedure).
74 When It Comes to Age and Fertility, How Old Is Too Oldfor Fertility Treatments?, USC FERTILITY,
http://uscfertility.org/fertility-treatments/age-and-fertility/ [https://perma.cc/U5H8-QTQB]; see also Egg
Freezing & Embryo Banking, supra note 18.
" Deciding to Freeze Your Eggs, EXTEND FERTILITY, htts//extendfertility.com/our-process/deciding-to-
ficeze [https://perma.ccS65A-PFHR].
76 Egg Freezing Extending the Biological Clock, UNC FERTILITY, https://uncfertility.com/treatment-
options/egg-freezing/ [https://perma.cc/8M6N-GB9U].
7 See Cha, supra note 15.
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use elective egg freezing.78 As actress Oliva Munn summarized: "Every girl should
do it. For one, you don't have to race the clock anymore. You don't have to worry
about it, worry about your job or anything. It's there." 7 When the natural
consequence of delaying reproduction is a decline in fertility that will end in
infertility, the prospect of time to delay the inevitable is tantalizing.so But hedging
against the inevitable-age-related infertility-is readily distinguished from freezing
one's eggs to prevent infertility that may result from treatment for a current
disease or disorder. The former is a type of highly-medicalized preventative
care-preventing the meaningful consequences of age-related changes that are years
or decades off-while the latter is part of treatment for an existing condition.
Though supporters of the move toward employer-provided coverage of elective
egg freezing have hailed such expanded coverage as long overdue, "' critics raise
many concerns. Some are beyond the scope of this paper-the impact elective egg
freezing may have on employer/employee relations, for example-but two merit
discussion. First, many caution that the technology falls far short of guaranteeing
future fertility. 82 The freezing process is imperfect. 8 When layered upon the
challenges of the IVF process and the variability in the health of a woman's eggs and
ability to carry a child, the success rate of elective egg freezing is far from 100%84
Though there is insufficient data to make definitive estimates, experts posit the
following probabilities of success: "[A] woman who is 35 with 10 eggs has a 69
percent chance of a baby. At age 37, she has a 50-50 chance. And at age 39, she has
a mere 39 percent chance."8 s A second criticism proceeds from the first: that the
costs-both psychic and monetary-of elective egg freezing may frequently exceed
" See id A recent anthropological study suggests that it is the inability to find a desirable partner
rather than desire to ensure sufficient time to dedicate to a career that motivates women to use elective
egg freezing. See Deficit ofEducated Men Is Driving Women to Freeze Eggs, Study Says, WOMEN WORLD,
(July 10, 2017), https://womenintheworld.com/2017/07/10/deficit-of-educated-men-is-driving-women-
to-freeze-eggs-study-says/ [https://perma.cc/BHL6-4RMK]; Kimberly Lawson, Women Are Freezing
Their Eggs Due to a 'Deficit' of Educated Men, Study Claims, BROADLY (July 5, 2017, 2:47 PM),
https://broadly.vice.com/en us/article/nevzwm/women-are-freezing-their-eggs-due-to-a-deficit-of-
educated-men-study-claims [https://perna.cc/H9UE-UCSC]; see also Heather Murphy, Lots ofSuccessful
Women Are Freezing Their Eggs. But It May Not Be About Their Careers., N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/health/freezing-eggs-women.html [https://perma.cc/BYQ8-H7G3].
71 Cha, supra note 23.
o See Erb, supra note 63 ("Nowadays, however, not all women are content to simply take their
chances. They're taking matters into their own hands by planning for the future with a technological twist:
freezing their eggs in order to have children on a schedule. And in some industries, such as the tech sector,
employers are more than happy to help.").
"j See Jessica Bennett, Company-Paid Egg Freezing Will Be the Great Equalizer, TIME (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://time.coi/3509930/company-paid-egg-freezing-will-be-the-great-equalizer/ [https://permacc/R684-8AT8].
82 
See Victoria Lambert, Motherhood on Ice: Has the Egg-Freezing Generation of Working Women Been
Misled?, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 18,2017,12:00 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/family/motherhood-ice-has-
egg-ficezing-generation-working-women-misled/ [https://perma.cc/EDV4-KBM8].
83 Cha, supra note 23.
* See id.
* Id.; see also La Ferla, supra note 22 (noting that women may not be aware of their own fertility
ahead of undergoing egg freezing as well as similarly low results).
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the benefits.86 As one fertility specialist succinctly characterized the idea that a
woman can "control" her fertility: "It's total fiction. It's incorrect.""8 If elective egg
freezing gives a woman a false sense of security, she may not only lose the money
she spent pursuing that security but also endure the emotional toll of infertility
itself."
As the next part details, both the nature and purpose of a potential medical
expense may influence its tax consequences. Considering the technology of elective
egg freezing itself, alongside its social context, four potential tax classifications
emerge. When an employer subsidizes the cost of elective egg freezing, the benefit
may be nonexcludable taxable compensation or excludable (either in whole or in
part) compensation." In the absence of an employer-provided benefit, elective egg
freezing is either a nondeductible personal consumption expense or deductible
medical care.90 Because section § 213 plays an important role in determining whether
elective egg freezing is either excludable compensation or a deductible medical
expense, the next Part details § 213 itself and relevant precedent.
II. MEDICAL EXPENSES: THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
All medical care toes the line dividing personal consumption and deductible
expense.9 1 Nevertheless, since 1942, Congress has provided tax relief for individuals
with significant medical expenses.9 2 A widely-accepted rationale for such relief is
that medical expenses reduce a taxpayer's ability to pay tax and should, therefore,
impact the individual's taxable income.9 3 For example, Individual A with gross
income of $100,000 and no medical expenses is meaningfully distinct from
Individual B with the same gross income but $20,000 of medical expenses. The
6 Cha, supra note 15
Id. (quoting Dr. James Grifo, an NYU fertility specialist).
See id.
89 See 26 U.S.C. § 105, 106, 213 (2012).
9 See id § 213, 262.
9' There is a healthy literature on § 213 and, to an even greater extent, personal deductions broadly.
Essential works in that area include: STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT
OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985);
William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309 (1972); Boris I. Bittker,
A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal ofIncome Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Thomas
D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343 (1989); Alan L.
Feld, Abortion to Aging: Problems ofDefinition in the Medical Expense Tax Deduction, 58 B.U. L. REV.
165 (1978); Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense
Deductions and the Exclusion ofMedical Insurance Premiums, 79 CALiF. L. REv. 1485 (1991); Mark G.
Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They
Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831 (1979); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal
Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REV. 679 (1988).
92 See The Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
9 See S. REP. NO. 77-1631, at 6 (1942) ("This allowance is recommended in consideration of the
heavy tax burden that must be borne by individuals during the existing emergency and of the desirability
of maintaining the present high level of public health and morale.").
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intuition is that though medical care may be understood as personal consumption,94
it is a different class of consumption from a vacation or a new car.95 Stated
differently, an individual does not choose to develop lung cancer while he does
choose to travel to the Bahamas. Thus, income spent to treat cancer is different from
other nondeductible consumption. The challenge, then, of § 213 is to sort between
qualifying medical care that warrants a subsidy (in Congress's view) and that which
is disqualified. A working knowledge of § 213 lays the foundation for understanding
how elective egg freezing fits within existing precedent.
A. Framework of§ 213
Section 213 authorizes a deduction for qualifying medical care to the extent the
costs of that care exceed 10% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.96 Section
213(d) defines medical care, in pertinent part, as "amounts paid for the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting
any structure or function of the body." This two-pronged, disjunctive definition
9 As a general rule, in an income tax system, personal consumption is subject to tax. The dominant
definition, from which there are many exceptions within the Code, derives from the Haig-Simons concept
of income where income equals consumption plus changes in wealth. See Joseph A. Pechman,
Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment 81 HARV. L. REV. 63, 64-65 (1967).
9s See Andrews, supra note 91 and Bittker, supra note 91 for early analysis of the weakness of the
tax expenditure concept and Surrey, supra note 91 for a definition of tax expenditure concept.
" 26 U.S.C. § 213 (2012). Adjusted gross income is defined in id. § 62. For Tax Years 2017 and 2018,
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act lowers that threshold back to the historic 7.5% AGI. Act to provide for
reconciliation pursuant o titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11027, 113 Stat. 2054, 2077 (2017) (hereafter, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act).
Expenses must also be unreimbursed and for the taxpayer, her spouse, or her dependents (though this
latter point is construed broadly in certain scenarios, such as kidney donation). This article assumes that
the healthcare system moving forward continues to be one in which individuals are likely to lack insurance
for preventative care and, therefore, may incur substantial unreimbursed costs.
9 26 U.S.C. § 213(d) (2012) (emphasis added). The provision reads in full:
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section-
(1) The term "medical care" means amounts paid-
(A) for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body,
(B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care referred to in
subparagraph (A),
(C) for qualified long-term care services (as defined in section 7702B(c)), or
(D) for insurance (including amounts paid as premiums under part B of title XVIII of the
Social Security Act, relating to supplementary medical insurance for the aged)
covering medical care referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) or for any qualified
long-term care insurance contract (as defined in section 7702B(b)).
In the case ofa qualified long-term care insurance contract (as defined in section 7702B(b)),
only eligible long-term care premiums (as defined in paragraph (10)) shall be taken into
account under subparagraph (D).
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provides two avenues for classifying a cost as medical care: a disease prong and a
structure/function prong.98
Importantly, Congress expanded § 213 beyond expenses readily identifiable as
medical. Expressly included as qualifying medical care are the costs of
"transportation primarily for and essential to medical care,"" certain insurance
payments,'" and qualified lodging while away from home to receive medical care."o'
Consider the example of lodging: allowing a deduction for the costs of lodging
"primarily for and essential to" medical care is consistent with the provision's goal
of relieving the burden of high medical care costs.'02 Such lodging costs are likely
duplicative of the rent or mortgage the individual pays for her primary residence and
are, at least somewhat, out of the individual's control. Yet lodging costs are also
intensely personal. Stated simply, everyone needs to live somewhere and, in tax, the
decision of where to live or stay is a paradigmatic personal expense.'0 3 Allowing a
deduction for lodging expenses then raises the risk of § 213 improperly subsidizing
insufficiently medical expenses. Cognizant of this thin dividing line, Congress
limited the deduction for lodging under § 213 not only to lodging "primarily for and
essential to medical care" but in which "there is no significant element of personal
pleasure, recreation, or vacation in the travel away from home."'" The essential
work of § 213 is, then, to sort between nondeductible personal expenses and personal
expenses that qualify for deductibility because they are sufficiently medical. It is
precisely upon this line that elective egg freezing teeters.
The Service looks to the basis of care-its social context-to help do the work
of sorting the personal from the medical. Cosmetic surgery provides an example.
Though the core definition of medical care has remained unchanged since the
provision became part of the Code in 1942,05 Congress, the Treasury, and courts
have fleshed out the scope of definition. For example, after years of the Service
9 See Davis, supra note 8 at 20-2 1; Pratt, supra note 10, at 1140; Katherine Pratt, The Tax Definition
of "Medical Care:" A Critique of the Startling IRS Arguments in O'Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 23
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 313, 322 (2016) [hereinafter Pratt, Definition of "Medical Care"].
* 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(1)(B) (2012).
'" See id. § 213(d)(1)(D).
'0o See id. § 213(d)(2) ("Amounts paid for lodging (not lavish or extravagant under the circumstances)
while away from home primarily for and essential to medical care referred to in paragraph (1)(A) shall be
treated as amounts paid for medical care if-(A) the medical care referred to in paragraph (1)(A) is
provided by a physician in a licensed hospital (or in a medical care facility which is related to, or the
equivalent of, a licensed hospital), and (B) there is no significant element of personal pleasure, recreation,
or vacation in the travel away from home."). Treasury Regulation § 1.213-1(e)(1) (2014) provides further
examples of potentially qualifying outlays that fall outside the bounds of being indisputably medical (e.g.
an air conditioner).
102 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(2) (2012).
103 See id. § 162, 262. Commuting expenses and the doctrine surrounding them provide the classic
view that where an individual lives is a textbook personal, consumption decision. The foundational case
in the area is Comm'r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1946) (disallowing a deduction for commuting
expenses on the rationale that the taxpayer's choice of residence is a wholly-personal decision).
104 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(2) (2012).
10' See The Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.). .
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permitting deductions for cosmetic surgery, Congress responded in 1990 with a new
limitation on the definition of medical care. 106 Adding §213(d)(9), Congress
specifically excluded elective cosmetic surgery from the definition of medical
care. 107 Cosmetic surgery is defined as "any procedure which is directed at
improving the patient's appearance and does not meaningfully promote the proper
function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease.""'s In contrast, cosmetic
surgery that "is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related
to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma,
or disfiguring disease," remains qualifying medical care. 1 Stated differently,
Congress took the position that while the procedures themselves were medical, the
motivation that underlay pursuing plastic surgery removed the basis for the medical
expense deduction. Elective cosmetic surgery is too personal to be medical and the
social context of its use is important."o
Cosmetic surgery aside, § 213's task of sorting medical expenses from personal
consumption is ostensibly easier when expenses are readily identifiable as medical.
A fact that should be relevant when the Service analyzes elective egg freezing,
Treasury Regulation 1.213-1(e) sets out a laundry list of qualifying expenses
including surgical expenses, hospital services, laboratory , services, diagnostic
services, and "other healing services."' The broad language of the Code itself and
expansive list of qualifying care within the regulations suggests that if an expense
can be described as "inherently medical,""2 "wholly medical,"" 3 or is, as this
Article describes, readily identifiable as medical, it clearly qualifies for deductibility.
Yet the concept of what is inherently, wholly, or readily identifiable as medical is
not fully defined. And when the Service or the courts view an expense as
1- 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(9) (2012).
'0' Id; see also 136 CONG. REC. 30570 (1990) ("[T]he committee determined that expenses for
cosmetic surgery and other similar procedures should not be eligible for the medical expense deduction,
unless the procedure is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from a congenital abnormality, a
personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease. Expenses for purely cosmetic
procedures that are not medically necessary are, in essence, voluntary personal expenses, which like other
personal expenditures (e.g., food and clothing) generally should not be deductible in computing taxable
income.").
'o 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(9)(B) (2012).
i'Id. § 213(d)(9)(A).
"o See Gerstacker v. Comm'r, 414 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1969) (highlighting that all medical expenses
remain personal, Section 213(a) is in the Code to create an exception from 26 U.S.C. § 262, and it does
not make medical expenses non-personal but declares a deduction for personal expenses within the
meaning of "medical care."). For a case discussing these issues in the context of sex reassignment surgery,
see O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010).
". Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (2014).
112 See Pratt, Definition of "Medical Care", supra note 98 at 321-22, 361.
113 Jacobs v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 813, 819 (1974). In Jacobs, the Tax Court does not define what
constitutes an expense that is wholly medical but implies that such an expense has little or no personal
consumption element. Id. ("There would seem to be little doubt that the expense connected with items
which are wholly medical in nature and which serve no other legitimate function in everyday life is
incurred primarily for the prevention or mitigation of disease."). This somewhat hollow description is
unsatisfying but the case remains influential.
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marginal-either because of its nature or purpose-both are quick to rely upon
language that they view as restricting the scope of § 213. This oft-cited language has
its origin in the legislative history of § 213 (then § 23) and found echoes in case law
and two sentences of Treasury Regulation 1.213-1(e).
In its discussion of then § 23, Senate Report 77-1631 stated both that the concept
of medical care should be broadly defined,'14 but also cautioned against interpreting
the provision too broadly: "It is not intended, however, that a deduction should be
allowed for any expense that is not incurred primarily for the prevention or
alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.""' In a similar vein, the
regulations state, in pertinent part, that "[d]eductions for expenditures for medical
care allowable under section 213 will be confined strictly to expenses incurred
primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness"
and that expenditures which are "merely beneficial to the general health of an
individual, such as an expenditure for a vacation" are not medical care."6 Courts
often use this language to frame the interpretation of § 213 and limit its scope."'
Thus, interpreting § 213 is a balancing act between the scope of its seemingly broad
language and the reach and validity of its arguably narrower purpose.
The Service's and courts' success in this endeavor is mixed. With an eye to
ensuring that § 213 does not overstep § 262's disallowance of personal expenses,"8
the Service has driven the development of inconsistent precedent. Alongside
precedent that suggests that the Service embraces a robust and diverse concept of
medical care-including viewing nonbiomedical naturopathy as medical
care" 9-exists precedent and pronouncements that retreat from such a view with an
eye toward the concern that § 213 is at risk of being stretched beyond its intended
scope. 120 As medical expertise and social mores advance, the scope of qualifying
114 See S. REP. No. 77-1631, at 6 (1942).
us Id. at 96.
116 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (2014).
"' See infra Part IV.
"8 See Haines v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 644, 646 (1979) ("In considering the question of deductibility of
expenditures for 'medical care' under section 213, it is necessary to bear in mind that section 262 prohibits
deductions for personal, living, and family expenses.").
" See Dickie v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1916 (1999); Tso v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1277
(1980). But see Huff v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2551 (1995).
120 In Havey v. Commissioner, the Tax Court analyzed § 213 in light of § 262, formerly § 24(a)(1), as
follows:
In approaching this question it is necessary to have in mind the basic concept
of section 24(a)(1) of the code that personal, living, and family expenses are not
deductible. Thus, many expenses, such as the cost of vacations, though
undoubtedly highly and directly beneficial to the general health, or athletic club
expenses by means of which an individual keeps physically fit, are not deductible
because they fall within the category of personal or living expenses. To be
deductible as medical expense, there must be a direct or proximate relation between
the expenses and the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease
or the expense must have been incurred for the purpose of affecting some structure
or function of the body.
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medical care must evolve.121 As an advancement of medical technology that does not
fall neatly within existing precedent, elective egg freezing presents a fascinating test
of the definition of medical care. With the basic framework of § 213 in mind,
examining the specific precedent hat is most relevant to categorizing elective egg
freezing is now appropriate.
B. Sorting the Medical from the Personal-Preventative Care
Elective egg freezing is, this Article argues, a highly medicalized form of
preventative care. Accordingly, understanding the preventative care precedent is
essential to the analytical goal of this paper: determining the tax classification of
elective egg freezing. Whether and to what extent preventative care qualifies as
medical care are deceptively challenging questions to consider and not ones with
consistent precedent; a fact that informs the doctrinal and critical contributions of
this Article.
By its terms, § 213(d) includes as medical "amounts paid for the diagnosis . .. or
prevention of disease." 122 The Service has long held, that the costs of
an annual physical qualify as medical care, regardless of whether the
individual has any particular condition at the time of the exam.123 Yet allowing
such care seems inconsistent with oft-cited limiting language such as that in the
Stringham v. Commissioner case: "The Congressional intent is sufficiently evident
to require the showing of the present existence or the imminent probability of a
disease, physical or mental defect, or illness as the initial step in qualifying an
expenditure as a medical expense."l24 Stringham expressly exempted diagnostic care
from this requirement,125 but precedent is less clear on preventative care. Further
12 T.C. 409, 411-12 (1949); see also Gerstacker v. Comn'r, 414 F.2d 448, 450 (6th Cir. 1969) ("Thus,
when the question of the deductibility of medical expenses arises, it must be kept in mind that a basic
scheme of the Code is to deny deductions for personal expenses.").
121 See generally, Davis, supra note 8 (discussing the influence of social mores on the definition of
medical care in § 213); Pratt, Definition of "Medical Care", supra note 98 (arguing against IRS position
that sought to deny § 213 deduction for gender transition surgery).
122 26 U.S.C. § 213(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
1
23
See IRS, PUB. 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 12 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V65-XXHR] ("You can include in medical expenses the amount you pay
for an annual physical examination and diagnostic tests by a physician. You don't have to be ill at the time
of the examination.").
124 Stringham v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 580, 584 (1949).
125 The court described its finding as follows:
In other words, the language used in the statutory definition and the report of the Senate
Finance Committee is sufficiently specific to exclude, except as to diagnosis, amounts
expended for the preservation of general health or for the alleviation of physical or mental
discomfort which is unrelated to some particular disease or defect. Secondly, it is clear that a
deduction may be claimed only for such expense as is incurred primarily for the prevention or
mitigation of the particular physical or mental defect or illness. The real difficulty arises in
connection with determining the deductibility of expenses which, depending upon the peculiar
facts of each case, may be classified as either "medical" or "personal" in nature. There would
seem to be little doubt that the expense connected with items which are wholly medical in
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complicating the inquiry is the fact that diagnostic care is, at least in part,
preventative care. Practitioners and insurers commonly characterize an annual
physical exam as a "preventative visit" because it uses early detection and diagnosis
of risk factors in order to prevent development of disease,12 6 yet precedent relies on
its diagnostic role. Is it, then, the diagnostic or preventative power of the annual
physical that justifies its treatment as medical care? The precedent is unclear. The
overlapping nature of diagnostic and preventative care and the precedent's failure to
clearly define either,127 contribute to confusion over the requirements for such care
to satisfy the medical care definition. Nevertheless, three important i sights can be
distilled from what precedent exists in this area.
First, categorizing diagnostic or preventative care as medical places great
pressure on the concept of care that is wholly or readily identifiable as medical. This
concept is, however, poorly defined. The Stringham case was the first to use the
"wholly medical" language and offered the limited clarification that if care is
"wholly medical" it "serve[s] no other legitimate function in everyday life," leaving
undefined those critical terms.128 Wholly medical is, then, related to the general
health and wellbeing of the individual, but this, in turn, is not defined. It is also highly
subjective, making the social context of the care deeply relevant. Further, the
legislative history may support a broad reading as it states that a purpose of the
deduction is to maintain "the present high level of public health and morale." 2 9
Treasury Regulation 1.213-1(e) provides other examples deemed medical care.130
Notably, diagnostic but not preventative care makes the list.'3 1 And this fact points
nature and which serve no other legitimate function in everyday life is incurred primarily for
the prevention or mitigation of disease. On the other hand, it is obvious that many expenses are
so personal in nature that they may only in rare situations lose their identity as ordinary personal
expenses and acquire deductibility as amounts claimed primarily for the prevention or
alleviation of disease.
Id. Compare id. (exempting diagnostic are from the requirement of showing the "present existence or
imminent probability" of a disease, defect, or illness), with I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-40-017 (Oct. 5,
2001) (finding that DNA collection and storage cannot qualify as medical care without a showing that
"the DNA will actually be used for medical diagnosis").
126 See, e.g., CDC Prevention Checklist, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/prevention/ [https://permacc/DV4V-5565]; UNITED HEALTHCARE, UNDERSTANDING
PREVENTIVE CARE SERVICES COVERED WITHOUT COST-SHARE,
https://www.uhc.com/content/dam/uhcdotcom/en/HealthReform/PDF/Provisions/UnderstandingPreventiveCar
e.pdf[https://permacc/C7HK-QZBH].
127 See I.R.S. Notice 2018-12, 2018-12 I.R.B. 441 (noting the poorly-defined nature of preventive
care in § 223). But see I.R.S. Notice 2004-23, 2004-1 C.B. 725 (attempting to define preventive care in
its discussion of high deductible plans and § 223 but narrowly limiting that definition).
128 Stringham, 12 T.C. at 584.
129 S. REP. NO. 77-1631, at 6 (1942).
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (2014).
'1' See id. § 1.213-l(e)(1)(ii) ("Amounts paid for operations or treatments affecting any portion of the
body, including obstetrical expenses and expenses of therapy or X-ray treatments, are deemed to be for
the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body and are therefore paid for medical
care. Amounts expended for illegal operations or treatments are not deductible. Deductions for
expenditures for medical care allowable under section 213 will be confined strictly to expenses incurred
primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness. Thus, payments for the
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to the second insight: the Service relies heavily upon the diagnostic category for care
it views as marginal.
Care that is readily identifiable as medical has the greatest chance of be classified
as medical care.13 2 But when that care cannot also be construed as treatment, the
Service frequently places such care in the diagnostic category to justify its
categorization.'3 3 A pregnancy test is medical care because it "test[s] for healthy
functioning of the body."'34 Amounts paid for an annual physical exam for an
asymptomatic person are medical because the cost "is for diagnosis."' 35 The
Service's tendency to emphasize the diagnostic role of care outside the treatment
context, rather than its potential preventative role, leads to the third insight: care
which is dominantly preventative care is subject to greater scrutiny.
The greater scrutiny to which preventative care is subject is, at least partially,
understandable. To date, many of the scenarios that developed the precedent
involved care not readily identifiable as medical, such as dance lessons"' or gym
memberships."' Stated differently, much of the precedent invoked when considering
preventative care involved costs not readily identifiable as medical. But boundaries
of the concept of preventative care are not clear.
Consider the example of a weight loss program. In Revenue Ruling 2002-19, the
Service held that the costs of a weight loss program to two taxpayers, one with a
diagnosis of obesity and the other hypertension, were deductible as medical care.3 1
In doing so it distinguished earlier precedent in which the Service held that
participation in a weight loss program, in the absence of a diagnosis for which weight
loss was the treatment, was a nondeductible personal cost.139 Substantially similar
care was, then, differently categorized when understood as preventative. Though a
weight loss program ahead of a diagnosis may be effective in staving off disease,
it is too tied to the "preservation of general health or for the alleviation of a
physical ... discomfort ... unrelated to some particular disease or defect" to qualify
as medical care.140 Preventative care, then, because of its very nature as preventative
following are payments for medical care: hospital services, nursing services (including nurses' board
where paid by the taxpayer), medical, laboratory, surgical, dental and other diagnostic and healing services,
X-rays, medicine and drugs (as defined in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, subject to the 1-percent
limitation in paragraph (b) of this section), artificial teeth or limbs, and ambulance hire.")
132 See Stringham, 12 T.C. at 584 ("There would seem to be little doubt that the expense connected
with items which are wholly medical in nature ... is incurred primarily for the prevention or mitigation
of disease.").
133 See id. at 584-86; Havey v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949); Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (2014).
1
3 Rev. Rul. 2007-72, 2007-2 C.B. 1154.
13s id.
136 Adler v. Comm'r, 330 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1964).
13 Peacock v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 177 (1978).
138 Rev. Rul. 2002-19,2002-1 C.B. 778.
"3' Id. (distinguishing its facts from those in Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116).
'4 Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (citing Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307).
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raises the concern that § 213 will create a backdoor means of deducting expenses
that are too personal.141
To police the boundaries of § 213 and preventative care, the courts and
the Service appeal to or create limiting language. The Service reiterates the
oft-articulated standard that the care must be rendered in the face of "the present
existence or imminent probability of a disease, defect, or illness."142 Both courts and
the Service recite the regulatory language stating that "[d]eductions for expenditures
for medical care allowable under section 213 will be confined strictly to expenses
incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or
illness." 43 To establish the necessary connection between the expense and medical
care, courts look for a "direct and proximate relationship" between the expense and
a disease or condition.'" Thus, in the context of preventative care, the Service and
the courts are quick to require a close connection between the care provided and a
disease or condition.
Yet the close connection requirement is flawed for at least two reasons. First, it
is flawed because, as scholars and even the Service have noted, the line of precedent
that excludes preveAtative care and the limiting language of the regulations and
legislative history of § 213, cannot apply broadly lest they improperly limit the scope
141 See Stringham v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 580, 584 (1949) ("The real difficulty arises in connection with
determining the deductibility of expenses which, depending upon the peculiar facts of each case, may be
classified as either 'medical' or 'personal' in nature.... [I]t is obvious that many expenses are so personal
in nature that they may only in rare situations lose their identity as ordinary personal expenses and acquire
deductibility as amounts claimed primarily for the prevention or alleviation of disease.").
142 Jacobs v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 813, 818 (1974).
143 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (2014).
144 Havey v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949) ("In determining allowability, many factors must be
considered. Consideration should be accorded the motive or purpose of the taxpayer, but such factor is
not alone determinative. To accord it conclusive weight would make nugatory the prohibition against
allowing personal, living, or family expenses. Thus also it is important to inquire as to the origin of the
expense. Was it incurred at the direction or suggestion of a physician; did the treatment bear directly on
the physical condition in question; did the treatment bear such a direct or proximate therapeutic relation
to the bodily condition as to justify a reasonable belief the same would be efficacious; was the treatment
so proximate in the time to the onset or recurrence of the disease or condition as to make one the true
occasion of the other, thus eliminating expense incurred for general, as contrasted with some specific,
physical improvement?"). Professor Pratt summarizes a related but distinct line of precedent which
establishes a "but for" test where the expenses are paid to nonmedical providers. See Pratt, supra note 10,
at 1292-93 ("Another group of section 213 cases involve fees paid to nonmedical providers, such as
lawyers, for items that are not recreational but are generally characterized as nondeductible personal
expenses. The IRS and courts classify these types of fees as medical expenses only if the services provided
by the person are necessary (using a 'but for' test) to treat the taxpayer's medical condition. For example,
in Gerstacker v. Commissioner, the court held that the taxpayers could take a section 213 deduction for
legal fees they paid to establish a guardianship for Mrs. Gerstacker. In the court's view, the fees were
necessary so that Mrs. Gerstacker could be committed to a mental institution for treatment. In another
section 213 case involving legal fees, Levine v. Commissioner, the court denied the taxpayers
a medical expense deduction for legal fees they paid to help their mentally ill son with various normal
personal activities, such as filling prescriptions, paying bills, buying clothes, hiring a housekeeper, and
finding ajob." (footnotes omitted)).
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of the structure/function prong. 145 It is true that the precedent that exists on
preventative care evolved by considering care that is not readily identifiable as
medical-such as physical exercise performed at a physician's instruction-and is,
therefore, not directly applicable to preventative care that is inherently-medical.14 6 It
is also true that the disjunctive nature of the medical care definition itself should
mean that if preventative care affects a structure or function of the body and is not
cosmetic surgery, no connection to illness should be required. But recently the
Service has retreated from early guidance (itself nonbinding), where it saw a clear
line between the disease and structure /function prong.147 The retreat points to the
second flaw of the close connection requirement: that it is ill-equipped to guide the
application of § 213 to the highly-medicalized type of care that elective egg freezing
represents. Thus, elective egg freezing enters an analytical space in which (a) the
Service is showing a retreat from its historic broader (and more doctrinally-sound)
view and (b) applicable precedent is poorly-developed. These doctrinal weaknesses
will, in the face of elective egg freezing, combine with the equally problematic
precedent on § 213 and reproductive care.
1s See, e.g., IRS, PUB 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 5-15 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V65-XXHR]. (listing care classified as medical, much of which would
not qualify if this limiting language was strictly applied); Pratt, supra note 10, at 1322-24. If the care is
not "wholly medical", the court applies a "but for" test to determine whether the expenses are deductible.
Specifically, the taxpayer must establish "both that the expenditures were an essential element of the
treatment and that they would not have otherwise been incurred for nonmedical reasons." Jacobs, 62 T.C.
at 819; see also id. ("The real difficulty arises in connection with determining the deductibility of expenses
which, depending upon the peculiar facts of each case, may be classified as either 'medical' or 'personal'
in nature. There would seem to be little doubt that the expense connected with items which are wholly
medical in nature and which serve no other legitimate function in everyday life is incurred primarily for
the prevention or mitigation of disease. On the other hand, it is obvious that many expenses are so personal
in nature that they may only in rare situations lose their identity as ordinary personal expenses and acquire
deductibility as amounts claimed primarily for the prevention or alleviation of disease."). Further,
preventative care may not be inconsistent with the legislative history, as the stated purpose of the Act was
both to assist individuals with unanticipated medical costs but also to "maintain[] the present high level
of public health and morale." S. Rep. No. 77-1631, at 6 (1942).
46 See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
147 The relevant 1972 IRS General Counsel Memorandum writes that Regulation 1.213-1:
[C]annot be given a broad interpretation without conflicting with other parts of the
regulations. This is so because the regulations specifically allow a deduction for obstetrical
expenses (generally not related to any physical or mental defect or illness) and because the
fourth sentence of section 1.213-l(e)(1)(ii) . . . concludes from statements made in the first
three sentences, that payments for medical and surgical services (among others) are payments
for medical care.
Accordingly, we conclude that the third sentence . . . of the regulations, confining
allowable medical expenses strictly to those incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation
of a physical or mental defect or illness, was not intended to, and does not, apply to any medical
expenses otherwise meeting the statutory definition of medical care, such as amounts paid for
legal surgical operations, since those operations affect a structure or function of the body.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972).
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C. Sorting the Medical from the Personal-Reproductive Care
Recently, reproductive care has tested the boundaries of § 213 and exposed the
weaknesses and biases of the Service's understanding of that area, including its
reliance upon the idea of choice in interpreting § 213. Because elective gg freezing
falls under the umbrella of reproductive care, this precedent is highly-relevant.
Though the authority in the area is limited (and not all has precedential value), a
recent case brings both greater clarity and, this Article contends, a sense of change.
That case-Morrissey v. U.S. 148-will be discussed at length but an understanding of
prior authority lays the necessary foundation.149
i. Structure/Function and the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Termination of Pregnancy
Much elective reproductive care qualifies as medical care under §213. When a
procedure is inherently medical-such as surgery-and does not fall within the
cosmetic surgery exception, the Service has viewed the costs of such procedures as
medical care because the procedures affect a structure or function of the body. Under
current law, care to diagnose, prevent, or end pregnancy qualifies as medical care,
for example."o Though it previously implied that elective use of birth control did not
qualify as medical care,"' in 1973 the IRS ruled that birth control costs qualified as
medical care regardless of whether the use of birth control was considered elective
or medically necessary.152 Permanent or semi-permanent forms of sterilization also
qualify as medical care per additional 1973 revenue rulings.' The deductibility of
all such care is grounded in the structure/function prong of § 213(d). Birth control,
sterilization procedures, and abortion each impact the woman's reproductive
148 226 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 2016), affd, 871 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2017).
14' Elsewhere I explore the Service's and court's struggle with applying § 213 to fertility treatments
and detail the state of current law. See generally Davis, supra note 8. Since the publication of that article,
however, the Eleventh Circuit decided Morrissey which involved the deductibility of IVF and surrogacy
costs that provides further, important precedent.
15 Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140; see also O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r.., 134 T.C. 34, 70 (2010)
(reiterating that abortion qualifies as "medical care" because it affects a structure or function of the body,
a triggering condition outlined by Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (2014)).
"' Rev. Rul. 67-339 (explaining that the Chief Counsel for the IRS permitted a deduction in
"circumstances [where], in the opinion of the physician[,] the possibility of childbirth raises a serious
threat to the life of the wife."); see also Davis, supra note 8, at 8 (describing the Commissioners position
that a woman who could not carry a child was "clearly [suffering from] a physical defect or illness" and
the use of birth control was, therefore, medical care under the disease prong (quoting Frederick R. Parker,
Jr., Federal Income Tax Policy andAbortion in the United States, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 335, 342
(2009)).
152 Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140. Deductibility was presumably permitted under the
structure/function prong. See I.R.S. Notice 2018-12, 2018-12 I.R.B. 441, for an analysis of vasectomies
in a different statutory context.
153 Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (classifying vasectomies and abortions as medical care); Rev.
Rul 73-603, 1973-2 C.B. 76 (classifying female sterilization procedures as medical care).
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function.154 Sterilization and abortion also impact the structure of the woman's body.
Similarly a vasectomy impacts both a structure of the male's body and his
reproductive function. So too are the costs of surgery to reverse prior, elective,
sterilization deductible as fertility enhancing care.'
Such precedent is consistent with the core definition of medical care itself." 6
And yet such care is open to the criticism that it, not unlike cosmetic surgery, is too
personal to be medical. is Stated differently, like cosmetic surgery, a vasectomy
impacts a function of the body but the motivation for having the procedure performed
is not within the scope of what Congress intended for § 213. And yet decisions to
delay or forego childbearing may be driven exclusively by personal choices
regarding how to structure one's life. Reproductive care, in this view, in the absence
of a disease or condition, is wholly personal consumption despite its impact on a
structure or function of the body.5 It is, the Service has inconsistently contended, a
matter of choice and, therefore, not medical regardless of how it fairs under § 213(d).
This position comes into the fore in the precedent on § 213 and fertility care.
ii. Treating the Disease of Infertility
A smattering of IRS pronouncements and limited case law set the backdrop for
the Morrissey case. What can be distilled from the precedent makes clear that the
core debate in applying § 213 in this realm, is whether reproduction is fundamentally
nondeductible personal consumption. To date, the Service has taken sometimes
conflicting positions. Publication 502 specifically states, in pertinent part, that "the
cost of the following procedures to overcome an inability to have children [are
medical expenses]: procedures such as in vitro fertilization (including temporary
storage of eggs or sperm)."' In private letter rulings, the Service has allowed
deductions for the costs of egg donation under the structure/function prong,
" Birth control may be used to treat diseases or conditions such as endometriosis, thereby qualifying
as medical care under the disease prong. See Endometriosis, MAYO CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/endometriosis/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20354661
[https://perma.cc/S6X5-94HY].
1s5 See IRS, PUB. 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 8 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V65-XXHR] ("You can include in medical expenses the costs of ...
[s]urgery, including an operation to reverse prior surgery that prevented the person operated on from
having children.").
156 See Davis, supra note 8, at 35 (arguing that such care is qualifying medical care and that the
Service's inconsistencies in this area result from implicit bias); Pratt, supra note 10, at 1144-61 (arguing
that that deductibility of fertility expenses is appropriate and supported by extant authority).
1' I personally do not find this analogy compelling. However, because it is the undercurrent of more
recent precedent in the area and is highly relevant to the interpretation of § 213 and elective egg freezing,
it is important to note.
158 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1156-61 (discussing the Service's position on surrogacy costs). Pratt
goes on to further develop her position after the Magdalin case in, Pratt, supra note 10, at 1302-07.
"9 IRS, PUB. 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL ExPENSES 8 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V65-XXHR].
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recognizing fertility as a function of the body and egg donation as a means of
affecting the recipient taxpayer's reproductive function."
Absent from these analyses is the sense that fertility care is personal consumption
driven by individual choice. The Service seems uninterested in casting the decision
that drove the care-to have a child-as personal choice. In its view, infertility
compelled the care-a condition outside the individual's control-not the preceding
choice to have a child. This approach is consistent with precedent outside the
reproductive care context. Neither the Service nor the courts would hold that the
setting of a broken leg was not medical care because the injury occurred skiing."'i
Yet the Service has taken a different view of the role of choice in the few cases
at the intersection of § 213 and fertility care. Specifically, it advocates a restrictive
view of the deductibility of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) without a
diagnosis of infertility, retreating from a broad interpretation of the
structure/function prong in reproductive care. In the most significant case prior to
Morrissey, the Service argued for and the court accepted, reading a disease
requirement into the structure/function prong. 162 The case, Magdalin v.
Commissioner, concerned the deductibility of surrogacy and ART expenses paid by
a man.I63 Denying a deduction, the Tax Court wrote:
The expenses at issue were not paid for medical care under the first
portion of section 213(d)(1)(A) because the requisite causal relationship
is absent. None of the expenses at issue was "incurred primarily for the
prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness." Sec.
1.213-1(e)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs. In other words, petitioner had no
medical condition or defect, such as, for example, infertility, that required
treatment or mitigation through IVF procedures. We therefore need not
answer lurking questions as to whether (and, if so, to what extent)
expenditures for IVF procedures and associated costs (e.g., a taxpayer's
legal fees and fees paid to, or on behalf of, a surrogate or gestational
carrier) would be deductible in the presence of an underlying medical
condition.' 6
By denying a deduction on the grounds that a disease must be present even for
expenses that satisfy the structure/function prong, the court held that the limiting
language so often used to deny preventative care applies even to care that is
160 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-18-017 (May 2, 2003); see also I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (June 30,
2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/05-0102.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C77-6X3Z].
161 Setting aside likely insurance coverage, setting a broken leg fits well within both prongs of § 213
and nothing in the precedent suggests the Service or courts would look to the cause of the broken leg in
their analysis. See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1168-69 (discussing the voluntary/involuntary nature of
reproductive care).
162 Magdalim v. Conim'r., 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008); see also Davis, supra note 8, at 20-21; Pratt,
supra note 10, at 1311-1344.
163 See Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 492.
64 Id. at 493.
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readily identifiable as medical.' Though the court noted that § 213 is written in the
disjunctive, it opined that the cosmetic surgery exception was evidence that Congress
intended to narrow the scope of the structure/function prong.'66
There is much to criticize in the Magdalin opinion and the Service's arguments
in the case, and scholars have done so in prior work.'16 The import of the case for
this Article is that it signals that the Service seems to be narrowing its interpretation
of the scope of § 213 by narrowing the structure/function prong.16 8 Courts, in turn,
seem receptive to the Service's position. The First Circuit affirmed the Magdalin
case and, as the next part explores, the Eleventh Circuit added its support.169
iii. Shifting Tides? Morrissey v. U.S. and the Future of§ 213
Morrissey v. U.S. is the culmination of a line of argument the Service developed
in an early, settled case 17 and Magdalin.'7 ' Specifically, it is a strong indicator that
the Service is committed to (1) narrowing the scope of the structure/function prong
and (2) casting reproductive care costs as too personal to be medical, injecting the
analysis with the rhetoric of choice.172 If the Service persists in both positions,
elective egg freezing is unlikely to qualify as medical care. More broadly, if the
Service continues to narrow the structure/function prong, emerging medical
technologies outside the reproductive realm are at risk of classification as personal
consumption. A discussion of the facts of the case, the arguments made therein, and
the lower and circuit court opinions lays the necessary foundation for understanding
the potential impacts of the case.
In Morrissey v. United States, Joseph Morrissey, a gay man, utilized egg
donation, in vitro fertilization, and gestational surrogacy to have children. '17 The
eggs were fertilized with Mr. Morrissey's sperm and he incurred over $100,000 in
costs to become a parent.174 Amending his 2011 return, Mr. Morrissey sought to
165 See id
1 66 See id. at 492 & n.5.
167 See Pratt, supra note 10; Infanti, supra note 10 at 171-173; Davis, supra note 8 at 13.
161 See Longino v. Comm'r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1491, aff'd, 593 Fed. Appx. 965 (11th Cir. 2014);
Pratt, supra note 7.
161 Magdalin v. Comm'r, No. 09-1153, 2009 WL 5557509 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 2009); Longino v.
Comm'r, 593 Fed. Appx. 965 (11th Cir. 2014).
170 See Pratt, supra note 7.
"' Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 492.
172 Morrissey has implications for tax, reproductive rights, and constitutional law. I began exploring
these issues shortly after the opinion was handed down. Tessa Davis, Morrissey v. U.S. and the IRS's
Hostility to Reproductive Choice, PRAWFSBLAWG (October 18, 2017),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/10/morrissey-v-us-and-the-irss-hostility-to-
reproductive-choice.html [https://perma.cc/24WQ-9LKF].
173 Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2017). Gestational surrogacy involves
a woman carrying an embryo created by implantation of another woman's egg with a man's sperm. See
id It is distinguished from traditional surrogacy wherein the embryo the woman carries is a product of
her own egg and a man's sperm. See id Mr. Morrissey provided the sperm for the procedure but pursued
parenthood with his now husband. Id.
174 id.
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deduct $36,538 175 of the ART costs, which, if allowed, would have entitled
Mr. Morrissey to a $9,539 refund."17 After the Service denied his § 213 deduction,
Mr. Morrissey appealed to the Middle District of Florida. 7
The Middle District granted the Service's motion for summary judgment.17 1 In
its opinion, the court asserted that because the "lVF process" was not performed on
the taxpayer's body the costs were nondeductible. 17' The court's analysis of
Morrissey's argument-that use of a surrogate and IVF were necessary to realize his
reproductive function-leaves much to be desired. The court repeatedly cited the
canon of construction that tax deductions are to be narrowly construed, failing to
address the fact that legislative history and existing precedent suggest that that
familiar canon is not as influential in the § 213 context.so It then reasserted that a
plain reading of the statute establishes that the IVF processes do not affect a structure
or function of Morrissey's body, without a particularly nuanced analysis of what an
individual's reproductive function is."' In brief, the Middle District asserted its
conclusion with little support or analysis.'82
Writing for the Eleventh Circuit, Judge Newsoml83 provides a clearer, though no
less problematic, rationale for denial of the deduction. The opinion relies
heavily upon dictionary definitions of the terms "function" and "affect" to reach its
conclusions.'84 Taking an atomized view of reproductive function, the court stated that:
'[F]unction' is defined as 'the action for which a person or thing is
specifically fitted, used, or responsible, or for which a thing exists'; 'the
activity appropriate to the nature or position of a person or thing'; or 'one
of a group of related actions contributing to a larger action,' such as 'the
normal and specific contribution of any bodily part (as a tissue, organ, or
system) to the economy of a living organism.' 85
Adopting this definition of function, the court construed Mr. Morrissey's
reproductive function as limited to the provision of sperm."' Though the court
'" Id. In 2011, medical expenses had to exceed a 7.5% of AGI threshold. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text. The $36,538 of costs Morrissey sought to deduct reflected the impact of that threshold.
176 Morrissey, 871 F.3d at 1263.
1n Id. at 1264.
17 Morrissey v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2016).
1" Idat 1342.
iso See id. at 1341-42.
'"' See id. at 1344 (rejecting Morrissey's argument that the ART costs were all necessary and
incidental to the fulfillment of his own reproductive function by using conclusory reasoning, stating "that
simply is not the case and that position runs contrary to the line of reasoning in all the case law cited").
182 Social context seems to inform the decisions in a manner similar to Magdalin.
1 The opinion generated a reasonable amount of interest for a tax case, likely due to its equal
protection analysis and that fact that it was one of Judge Newsom's, a Trump appointee, first opinions at
the Eleventh Circuit.
184 See Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2017).
1 8 Id. at 1263 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 920-21 (2002)).
1s6 Id. at 1266 ("The male body's necessary function within the reproductive process i simply stated:
it must produce and provide healthy sperm . . . .").
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recognized a potential broader read of function in § 213, it stated that the "limiting
modifier" of § 213(d)--that medical care must affect a structure or function "of the
body"-required its narrower view. 8 This view ignores, however, the broader
construction of the term "of the body" that the Service permitted in a line of
precedent on the deductibility of kidney donor costs. 188 It also ignores the
aggregation of bodies within the statute itself.89 Thus, while the court's construction
is not untenable, it was also not required by existing precedent or the terms of the
statute itself.
Because the Morrissey opinion is the most thorough circuit court opinion on
reproductive care under § 213, the precedent it set is important. Had the court
adopted a holistic view of reproduction-one which did not sever male and female
reproductive functions but instead focused on the end result of successful
reproduction, a child-§ 213 could operate to subsidize reproduction regardless of
the individual's gender, sexual orientation, or marital status. Instead, the court
adopted the limited view of reproduction that the Service offered-focusing on the
respective male and female contributions to the production of a child in
isolation-that, when filtered through the lens of tax, casts reproduction outside the
context of a heterosexual, married couple as a personal consumption decision.190
In Morrissey, the Service took a different track in arguing for disallowance than
it did in Magdalin. Gone was the express argument that the structure/function prong
had an implied disease requirement. "' In its place was the argument that the
structure/function prong itself is narrower than its terms. 192 Arguing that
reproductive function in § 213 is limited to the unique contribution of the taxpayer's
body to the reproductive process allows the Service to narrow the structure/function
prong and cast reproduction (of certain individuals) as wholly personal-and it does
so in a manner that is less subject to criticism than its argument in Magdalin.
Because § 213 is written in the disjunctive, the Service's argument that the
structure/function prong still requires the presence of disease seems to be in obvious
conflict with the statute (though the argument still persuaded the Tax Court in
Magdalin). The argument in Morrissey is more sophisticated. In effect, the Service
imported a disease requirement into the structure/function prong and its judgment
that reproduction is a personal consumption decision via the backdoor by narrowing
of the prong itself. An example clarifies this point.
"'
7 Id. at 1265.
188 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-18-017 (May 2, 2003). Professor Pratt connects this line of
precedent to her analysis of fertility and surrogacy costs under § 213 in Pratt, supra note 7, at 1156-61
and Pratt, supra note 10, at 1297-1303.
189 Section 213 itself allows for aggregation of the taxpayer's body with those of family members as
it allows a deduction for qualifying medical expenses of the taxpayer and her spouse and dependents.
§213(a).
190 For a thorough discussion of this point, see Davis, supra note 8 (analyzing how section 213 is not
evenhandedly applied to allow the deduction), Pratt, supra note 10, and Infanti, supra note 10, at 161-63.
19 See supra notes 159-166 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 178-188 and accompanying text.
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In earlier authority (albeit nonprecedential) the Service stated that reproduction
is a function of the body.'93 If the reproductive function means the nd result of that
function-a child-expenses incurred to enable an individual to have a child affect
a function of that person's body. Whether an individual has diagnosable infertility
should be irrelevant, then, if the care satisfies the structure/function prong. If instead
function is defined more narrowly to mean only the respective contributions of male
and female bodies to reproduction, infertility must be present for care to be
deductible. A male body can only produce sperm, so costs such as egg donor fees
and surrogacy cannot be tied to his reproductive function. Such an argument is not
untenable, but it is, as I and others have argued, unfair.'94
It is unfair because it ends in § 213 subsidizing fertility care of certain bodies
(heterosexual and married) more than that of others (single, LQBTQ, and male).
Most importantly, in light of the history of the Service's arguments in this area, the
narrowing of the structure/function prong is consistent with the Service's apparent
goal of writing a disease requirement into the structure/function prong. Thus, rather
than a principled construction of what the language of the Code says, narrowing the
structure/function prong was the Service's means of making the Code say what the
Service thought it should.
In addition to the narrow construction of reproductive function, the Morrissey
opinions adopt a potentially problematic frame of care that clearly involves the
taxpayer's body. Both opinions focus on the deductibility of the more expensive egg
donor and surrogacy costs, rather than the costs of diagnostic tests for sperm
collection from Mr. Morrissey.1"I Because the latter costs only totaled $1,500
dollars, in isolation they fell under the then 7.5% AGI threshold of § 213, so the
courts' focus is appropriate. i" However, both courts do briefly consider the
deductibility of such costs.'9 7 The Eleventh Circuit makes the somewhat qualified
statement that the sperm collection "could be said to have affected his reproductive
function"' 9 while the district court properly asserts that "the collection of Plaintifrs
193 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
'sSee Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1263, 1265 (11th Cir. 2017); Morrissey v. United
States, 226 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1344-45 (M.D. Fla. 2016).
196 Morrissey, 871 F.3d at 1263 ("All told, the IVF process cost Mr. Morrissey more than $100,000.
In 2011 alone-the tax year at issue in this case-Mr. Morrissey paid nearly $57,000 out of pocket for
IVF-related expenses. Of that total, only about $1,500 went toward procedures performed irectly on
Mr. Morrissey's body-namely, blood tests and sperm collection. He spent the remaining $55,000 to
identify and retain the women who served as the egg donor and the gestational surrogate, to compensate
those women for their services, to reimburse their travel and other expenses, and to provide medical care
for them.").
197 See id. at 1267 ("To be sure, the aspects of the IVF process that related specifically to
Mr. Morrissey's provision of healthy sperm could be said to have affected his reproductive function. So,
for instance, if the $1,500 that Mr. Morrissey spent on sperm collection and accompanying bloodwork
had exceeded the applicable 7.5%-of-AGI threshold, it would have been deductible. But as already
explained, it didn't-by a long shot-and so it wasn't."); Morrissey, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 1342.
'98 Morrissey, 871 F.3d at 1267.
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sperm undeniably affected the structure and/or function of his body." '9 9 The
Eleventh Circuit's seeming skepticism of whether sperm collection is medical care
is inconsistent with the language of § 213 itself. But it and the Middle District's
linking of the sperm collection to the overall 1VF process is more problematic.
Specifically, both courts imply that the sperm collection costs would be deductible
when performed in the context ofIVFprocess.20 Lumping the sperm collection into
a broader process, rather than considering each procedure in its own right, runs
counter to the Service and court's historic approach.201' Doing so may not always run
counter to the taxpayer's interest, but, regardless of the impact on classification,
improperly aggregating care increases the potential for misclassification and is
inconsistent with long-running precedent.
Beyond these flawed approaches to § 213, the Service used and the courts
embraced using the rhetoric of choice to frame interpreting § 213, thereby giving
greater importance to the social context of care. As part of his rationale for
disallowing a medical expense deduction to Mr. Morrissey, Revenue Agent Gary
Shepard focused on Mr. Morrissey's choice to use egg donation, in vitro fertilization,
and surrogacy to have a child.2 02 Conveying his sense that disallowing the deduction
was plainly supported by the language of the Code, Agent Shepard wrote: "The first
reason [for disallowance] is because there is no Medical Condition. The Taxpayer
does have the ability to have Children with a member of the opposite sex but, not the
same sex. The Taxpayers [sic] decision not to have children with a member of the
opposite sex is a personal choice and not a Medical Condition."203 Though the
199 Morrissey, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 1342. But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-40-017 (Oct. 5, 2001)
(showing the Service indicating its position that "DNA collection and storage is not by itself medical
care.").
200 See Morrissey, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 1342 ("As Defendant correctly asserts, although the collection
of Plaintiff's sperm undeniably affected the structure and/or function of his body, the process ultimately
and necessarily only affected the structure and function of the bodies of the third-party donors or chosen
surrogate, who Plaintiff admits were neither a spouse nor dependent. Therefore, Plaintiff simply is not
entitled to a deduction for those expense under the plain language of § 213(a)."); Morrissey, 871 F.3d at
1267 ("To be sure, the aspects of the IVF process that related specifically to Mr. Morrissey's provision of
healthy sperm could be said to have affected his reproductive function.").
201 For example, see O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010), action on dec., 2011-47 (Nov.
21, 2011), acq., 2011-47 I.R.B. 773, where the court considered three aspects of the taxpayer's treatment
for gender identity disorder, in tum-hormone therapy, sex reassignment surgery, and breast
augmentation surgery. For additional discussion of the lumping together that occurred in Morrissey, see
Katherine Pratt, Morrissey Creates New Uncertainty Regarding Tax Deductions for IVF Egg Donation,
and Surrogacy, TAxPROFBLOG (October 26, 2017) (noting the potential confusion caused by the court's
improperly grouping multiple procedures into one aggregate procedure for § 213 analysis and stating that
"[t]he most confusing aspect of the Morrissey opinion is the court's use of the term "IVF-related expenses"
to refer to an entire series of fertility treatment procedures.") (emphasis added)).
202 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260, (11th Cir. 2017) (No.
17-10685) ("During the course of the audit, Shephard stated that Morrissey was not entitled to the
deduction because it was Morrissey's "choice" not to pursue heterosexual intercourse to conceive.").2031 d. at 4-5.
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explicit language of choice dropped away as the case progressed, the choice frame
persisted.204
But choice cannot be decisive. It is inconsistent to assert hat Mr. Morrissey chose
to use assisted reproductive technologies but not find the same choice when
medically-infertile and married taxpayers use similar technologies to have a child.
If, however, the Service continues to use the choice frame, elective gg freezing is
at risk of disallowance because of the social context of its use.
The Morrissey opinions make clear the challenge of determining where medical
care begins and nondeductible personal consumption ends. The district and circuit
courts that considered the cases were correct in that § 213 represents a departure
from the general rule that personal expenses are nondeductible and that, as such,
§ 213(d) guards against the potential of turning nondeductible costs into deductible
costs by dressing them in the trappings of medical care.205 But the Service's
arguments and the courts' opinions signal a marked narrowing of § 213. The key
takeaways for this Article are: (1) that Morrissey reinforces the importance of the
choice frame and social context in analyzing reproductive care under §213; and
(2) that the Service may be able to effectively write a disease requirement into the
structure/function prong by directly narrowing the prong itself.206 It is possible that
the Service will stop at Morrissey-that it may not seek to further narrow the
structure/function prong or classify all reproductive care nondeductible. But the
uncertainty created by Morrissey is precisely what makes the application of § 213 to
elective egg freezing a litmus test.
204 In its fundamental rights analysis, the Eleventh Circuit echoed the choice frame, describing the
potential fundamental right at issue as the "fundamental right to procreate via an IVF process that
necessarily entails the participation of an unrelated third-party egg donor and a gestational surrogate."
Morrissey, 871 F.3d at 1269. By using the word "necessarily", the court makes clear that it understands
that Mr. Morrisey required an egg donor and surrogate to have a child. Yet even as it recognizes that fact
it casts Mr. Morrisey's decision as one option of many. Implied in the court's narrow framing of the
fundamental right at issue is the idea that Mr. Morrisey had other options and instead chose to use assisted
reproductive technologies.
205 See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-l(e)(1)(ii) (2012) ("However, an expenditure which is merely beneficial
to the general health of an individual, such as an expenditure for a vacation, is not an expenditure for
medical care.").
206 In its fundamental rights analysis, the Eleventh Circuit described the potential fundamental right
at issue as "the fundamental right to procreate via an IVF process that necessarily entails the participation
of an unrelated third-party egg donor and a gestational surrogate." Morrissey, 871 F.3d at 1269. The
Service and the courts framed the care at issue similarly. In their view, Mr. Morrissey hadn't made the
decision to have a child and then sought the care necessary to effectuate that decision. Instead, he chose
to use assisted reproductive technologies. Describing Mr. Morrissey's choice in this way opens the door
to casting his decision as one of a number of possible consumption decisions-not having a child, adopting
a child, or having a child without the use of reproductive technologies. It is also in tension with the implied
framing of precedent that allows a deduction for assisted reproductive care. When the taxpayers using
assisted reproductive technologies are medically-infertile and married, the taxpayers did not choose to use
assisted reproductive t chnologies but rather chose to have a child and their use of assisted reproductive
technologies was not a choice but compelled by their infertility. These two descriptions of the relevant
choice cannot coexist. I explore the characterization and role of choice in Taxing Choices (draft available
with author).
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III. CATEGORIZING ELECTIVE EGG FREEZING
Elective egg freezing embodies a fascinating combination of technology and the
social context of its use that does not lend itself to easy interpretation under § 213,
making it an opportunity to test the boundaries of the medical care definition and
expose its shortcomings. As it hedges against inevitable but not necessarily imminent
infertility, it tests the boundaries of qualifying preventative care. Because aspects of
the procedure impact the structure and function of a woman's body, it seemingly fits
well within the structure/function prong. Yet Morrissey and prior precedent on § 213
are unclear as to whether reproductive care is too bound up with the general health
and well-being of the individual to qualify as medical care. In short, elective egg
freezing defies ready categorization. This Part considers each of the three possible
approaches of § 213 that the Service may adopt: (1) Full classification as medical
care; (2) Partial classification as medical care; or (3) Classification as personal
consumption/non-medical care, highlighting the weaknesses of existing doctrine and
the implications of the Service's categorization for tax policy and doctrine.
A. Elective Egg Freezing Under Pre-Morrissey Precedent
Though not indisputable, the weight of pre-Morrissey precedent points toward at
least partial classification of egg freezing as medical care. The following Part,
consistent with pre-Morrissey precedent, considers each aspect of the egg freezing
process and whether it satisfies § 213, in isolation.
i. The Argument for Full Classification as Medical Care
There is a tenable argument that the entire cost of the elective egg freezing
process should qualify as medical care under the structure/function prong of
§ 213(d).207 The hormone treatments required to stimulate egg production affect both
a structure-the woman's ovaries-and function-the release of eggs by the body.208
Egg retrieval-the insertion of a needle through the woman's vaginal wall to extract
the eggs-at a minimum affects a structure of the woman's body.209 Whether the
retrieval process affects a function of the body is less clear.210 Because the number
of a woman's eggs is finite, it can be argued that egg retrieval impacts a woman's
reproductive function by reducing the number of eggs available for future ovulation
207 Contra Erb, supra note 63, at 4 (arguing, without significant explanation, that elective egg freezing
is not medical care under § 213.).
208 See 26 U.S.C. § 213(b) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (2014) (including the cost of prescription
drugs as medical care); Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 82-111, 1982-1 C.B. 48 (holding
that the scalp is construed as a structure of the body); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-18-017 (May 2, 2003)
(holding that an egg donor's medical costs were allowed as a deduction).
209 Cf I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-40-017 (Oct. 5, 2001) (opining but not ruling that DNA collection
is not medical care). DNA collection is readily distinguishable from egg retrieval, however, because the
latter is significantly more invasive.
210 But see Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1263-66 (11th Cir. 2017).
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cycles.2 11 That care, however, affects a structure but is not cosmetic surgery, and that
should be sufficient to pull it into the category of medical care.212
Classifying hormone treatment and egg retrieval as medical care is consistent
with existing administrative pronouncements on elective reproductive care. The
costs of prescription drugs readily satisfy the medical care definition.213 Thus the
hormone treatments, like birth control, fit within § 213.214 Bloodwork and ultrasound
tests tied to the egg retrieval process are similar to the care expressly identified as
medical under Treasury Regulation 1.213-1 .215 Further, the egg retrieval process
is readily identifiable as medical, as it is a surgical procedure. The fact that
it was undergone at the individual's discretion-that it was not medically
necessary-should not be determinative, just as it was not in the case of elective
sterilization or abortion procedures.216 In brief, under pre-Morrissey precedent the
structure/function prong should pull both the stimulation and retrieval aspects of
elective egg freezing into the category of medical care.
Whether egg storage qualifies as medical care is harder to determine. The Service
has stated that temporary storage of eggs or sperm qualifies as medical care.217
However, allowance of the deduction in that context seems dependent upon the
individual suffering from an "inability to have children" and the storage being for a
limited period of time.218 A woman who utilizes elective egg freezing has neither a
diagnosis of infertility nor the intent to use her frozen eggs in the near future.
Nevertheless, if the Service understood the egg storage process to be inherently
medical and not a benefit to the general health of the woman, it could qualify the
costs as deductible alongside the hormone treatment and egg retrieval processes.219
211 Clinics use this point to sell their services. See La Ferla, supra note 22 ("[C]linics like Prelude,
Pacific NW Fertility in Seattle, Shady Grove in Washington and Ova in Chicago began reminding their
youngest target customers that fertility is finite and begins to wane as early as one's 20s. Those clinics
once catered almost exclusively to women at the older end of their childbearing years. Their messaging,
generally friendly and fact based but in some cases alarmist in tone, varies from Ova's invitations to
'freeze for your future,' to Extend's more urgent 'eggs are a nonrenewable resource."').
212 See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
213 IRS, PUB. 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL ExPENSES 12 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.ce/4V65-XXHR].
214 Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140.
215 See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (2014) ("Thus, payments for the following are payments for medical
care: hospital services, nursing services (including nurses' board where paid by the taxpayer), medical,
laboratory, surgical, dental and other diagnostic and healing services, X-rays."). But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2001-40-017 (Oct. 5, 2001) (indicating that deductibility for tests seems to turn upon their diagnostic
role).
216 See supra notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
217 See IRS, PUB. 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSEs 8 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V65-XXHR].
218 Id.
2 19 
Tis outcome seems unlikely, as will be addressed in the next example. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2001-40-017 (Oct. 5, 2001). One aspect of the DNA collection discussion weighs in favor of pulling the
storage costs into classification as medical care because of its role as an essential element of broader,
qualifying care. This view, however, was not part of the ruling which itself is nonbinding. Id. Consider,
however, how the Eleventh Circuit's grouping of separate aspects of care into one process could bootstrap
storage into qualification. See supra Subsection II.C.iii.
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ii. The Argument for Partial Classification as Medical Care
Partial classification of elective egg freezing as medical care is more likely than
full classification. Even if the IRS classifies the hormone stimulation and egg
retrieval phases of the elective egg freezing process as medical care, the storage costs
are at significant risk of disallowance. A recent private letter ruling outside the
reproductive context is instructive. In 2010, the Service addressed the question of
whether the costs of banking umbilical cord blood, in case the blood would be
required in the future, were deductible.220 The Service advised the taxpayers that
such costs were not deductible as there was no immediate or imminently probable
disease for which the treatment potential of the cord blood was recommended or
required.221 It would be unsurprising to see the Service extend that view to long-term
egg storage.
Even if not determinative, the ruling is revealing. Relying upon the imminent
probability standard requires viewing the care as not wholly medical. Indeed, to
support its position in the donor cord blood ruling, the Service cited two
cases-Jacobs v. Commissioner and Stringham v. Commissioner, neither of which
dealt with care that is readily identifiable as medical.2 22 Jacobs considered whether
legal fees for a divorce recommended by a psychiatrist were deductible as medical
care: they were not.223 Stringham considered whether the costs of moving a child
with a pulmonary disorder to, and educating her at, a school in a warmer climate
satisfied the then new definition of medical care: they did in part.224 Arguably,
storage of bodily materials, whether blood or eggs, is more clearly medical than are
legal, moving, or educational fees. By Stringham's own guidance-wholly medical
care has "no other legitimate function in everyday life" 225 -it is difficult to envision
the everyday function of frozen eggs. Nevertheless, the Service took the position that
storage of cord blood was too tenuously connected to prevention or treatment of
disease to satisfy the definition of medical care. Stated differently, storage of cord
blood-an expense that is for a highly-medical, technical service necessary to the
preservation of bodily tissue for future use-was a personal, rather than medical
expense.
Invoking the "imminent probability" of disease standard, and the line of
precedent of which it is a part, opens the door to disallowing the egg storage costs.
With Stringham, Jacobs and related cases comes a set of factors for the court to
220 I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2010-17 (Mar. 26, 2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/10-0175.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H7HC-4PEA].
221 Id ("Cord blood contains stem cells that doctors may use to treat disease. Thus, expenses for
banking cord blood to treat an existing or imminently probable disease may qualify as deductible medical
expenses. However, banking cord blood as a precaution to treat a disease that might possibly develop in
the future does not satisfy the existing legal standard that at a minimum a disease must be imminently
probable.").
222 Id.
223 Jacobs v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 813, 814, 820 (1974).
224 Stringham v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 580, 581, 586 (1949).
225 Id. at 584 (discussing Congressional intent when enacting § 23 in 1949).
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evaluate in determining whether care is medical. These factors include: whether the
care was performed or recommended by a physician,226 the taxpayer's motive in
incurring the expense,22 7 the expected efficacy of the care22 8 and the time gap
between the care and the condition to which it relates.229 Such factors could, if made
applicable to elective egg freezing-and the class of highly medical preventative
care of which it is a part-strongly push against classification as medical care.
In addition to challenging the relevance of the imminent probability standard and
related case law, one can distinguish between banking cord blood in the face of
unknown and potentially low probability diseases, and the freezing of eggs with an
eye to the certainty of eventual infertility. Assuming, arguendo, that the imminent
probability standard is relevant, egg storage fairs better than cord blood storage. The
child for whom the cord blood is stored may never develop any of the approximately
eighty diseases for which the stem cells in cord blood may provide treatment.23o A
woman is, however, guaranteed to become infertile at some point in her adult life.231
Elective egg freezing and the storage it requires is, then, arguably more strongly
connected to prevention of a disease or disorder than is storage of cord blood.
Nevertheless, because it is prospective rather than diagnosed infertility that drives a
woman to freeze her eggs and because storage should be considered in isolation, the
Service is likely to argue that the expense does not qualify as medical care.2 32
Setting aside whether it is a proper interpretation of § 213, disallowing a
deduction for the egg storage portion of elective egg freezing would have a relatively
limited impact on the extent of § 213's subsidy for elective egg freezing. With an
average cost of annual storage of $500, if a taxpayer had no other medical expenses,
she would need to have an AGI of less than $4,999 for the first dollar of her egg
storage costs to be deductible.2 33 Thus, because it is the least expensive portion of
226 Havey v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 409,412 (1949); see also Seymour v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 1111, 1117 (1950).227 Havey, 12 T.C. at 412; Stringham, 12 T.C. at 585.228 Havey, 12 T.C. at 412.
229 id.
230 How Is Cord Blood Used Today?, VIACORD, https://www.viacord.com/treatments-and-
research/treatable-diseases-today/ [https://perma.cc/2Z6F-QN2B].
231 The average age of menopause is 51, however, infertility declines significantly ahead of menopause.
Menopause, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/menopausesymptoms-
causes/syc-20353397 [https://perma.cc/5XL4-ZBAK]; Infertility, MAYO CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/infertility/symptoms-causes/syc-20354317
[https://perma.cc/K553-DMME] (explaining that fertility declines significantly after age 37). Such
age-related changes also raise the question of whether or when prevention of age-related changes qualifies
as medical care. Pratt, supra note 7, at 1124-25 (discussing Professor Joseph Dodge's opinion on
age-related changes under § 213).
232 Such an argument would be consistent with the IRS's arguments in Havey. 12 T.C. at 412-13.
Though the case did not involve inherently medical expenses, the Service has already demonstrated its
view that storage is not an inherently medical expense. See IRS, PUB. 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL
EXPENSES 5-14 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V65-XXHR].
Despite the inevitability of infertility, however, there is no certainty that the woman who stores her eggs
will be infertile at the time she decides to become pregnant-a fact that cuts against deductibility.
233 Under the 10% standard that previously applied. 26 U.S.C. § 213 (2012). The 10% standard does
not apply for 2017 and 2018. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11027, 113 Stat.
2054, 2077 (2017).
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the elective egg freezing process, a deduction for egg storage costs is the easiest cost
with which to part.
B. A Narrower § 213: Elective Egg Freezing Post-Morrissey and the
Argument Against Deductibility
A post-Morrissey Service is likely to argue that elective egg freezing is a wholly
nondeductible, personal expense. Morrissey shifts the analysis of egg freezing under
§ 213 in two important ways. First, Morrissey may be read as signaling a trend
toward, at its broadest, viewing all reproductive care or, more narrowly, assisted
reproductive technologies, through a choice frame. Second, it signals a willingness
to limit the structure/function prong as means of overriding the disjunctive nature of
§ 213 and imbuing the prong with a disease requirement.234
The social context of elective egg freezing does not fare well in a choice
framework. If it adheres to a choice frame, the Service is likely to argue against
elective egg freezing being qualifying medical care. As a means of preserving
fertility by hedging against future infertility, elective egg freezing fits well within
the realm of fertility care. With disallowance of the deduction as its end goal, the
Service would argue that because the decision to have a child is a persorial
consumption decision, any costs incurred in pursuit of that goal run afoul of the
legislative history and regulatory limiting language of § 213. The costs of having a
child are "an expenditure which is merely beneficial to the general health of an
individual." 235 It would caution that Congress warned against an overly-broad
deduction as it wrote that: "it is not intended, however, that a deduction should be
allowed for any expense that is not incurred primarily for the prevention or
alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness."236 And for good measure, it
would remind the taxpayer and the court that deductions are "matters of legislative
grace," thus § 213 should be construed as a narrow exception to the general
disallowance of deductions for personal expenses in § 262.237 As a cost directly tied
to preserving the ability to have a child, elective egg freezing is, in this view, just
one more of a smattering of fertility costs, all of which are too personal to be
medical.238
To succeed in disallowing the costs of elective egg freezing, the Service would
have to establish that the care fails both the disease and structure/function prongs. If
elective egg freezing can satisfy the disease prong, it must do so as preventative care.
Analyzing elective egg freezing under the preventative care precedent brings its
weaknesses to the fore, however.
Elective egg freezing does not fit well within the existing precedent on
preventative care. Because it is readily identifiable as medical-elective egg freezing
234 See supra Subsection II.C.iii.
235 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (2014).
236 S. REP. No. 77-1631, at 96 (1942).
237 Morrissey v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1344-45 (M.D. Fla. 2016).
238 This is an argument that the Service has made. See Pratt, supra note 10 at 1160-61.
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requires prescription drugs, anesthesia, and the services of a physician-it is easily
distinguished from dance lessons, a gym membership, or a move to a warm
climate.239 Such preventative care frequently is "merely beneficial to the general
health" of the individual.240 Rather than being compelled by medical exigency, it is
the product of individual choice. And if it is committed to the choice frame for § 213,
the Service could use the inadequacies of existing primary care precedent o bolster
its argument that elective egg freezing is too personal to be medical-an argument
that Morrissey and the authority that preceded it suggest the Service is keen to
make.241
Part of the preventative care framing would rely upon the Service challenging the
view that elective egg freezing qualifies as "wholly medical."2 4 2 It demonstrated a
willingness to do so in opining that DNA collection and storage is subject to the
"imminent probability" of disease standard (which should apply only to non- wholly
medical care). 243 In making this argument, the Service could assert that the
"legitimate function[s]" process serves in daily life are in giving a woman peace of
mind, allowing her to make the decision to delay childbearing, to devote more time
to career, to take more time to find a partner-in brief, to make immensely personal
lifestyle choices.2" If the Service succeeded in arguing that elective egg freezing is
not "wholly medical" it would then have a slew of factors at its disposable to argue
against deductibility. And because "wholly medical" is poorly-defined, the Service
has the space to do so.
Under existing preventative care precedent, the woman's motivation in using
elective egg freezing is relevant, as is the temporal relationship between the care and
the condition prevented.245 Because the motivations for using elective egg freezing
are easily framed as lifestyle choices, the Service would argue that elective egg
freezing is closer to a § 262 personal expense than § 213 medical care.246 It would
emphasize the fact that the condition prevented (or delayed) is too far in the future
to be construed as being tied to the current outlay for egg freezing. The Service could
highlight that while infertility is inevitable, the woman who uses egg freezing may
not actually be infertile when she decides to have a child-a fact that would render
the care unnecessary. It may also emphasize that rates of using frozen eggs to have a
child are variable and decline with age, to argue that the woman could not have a
reasonable belief that the care would be "efficacious."247 In brief, if the Service could
successfully frame elective egg freezing as speculative, not wholly-medical
239 See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
240 Treas. Reg. 1.213-1(e) (2014); see also supra notes 120-132 and accompanying text (discussing
the Havey and Stringham line of precedent).
241 See supra Subsection II.C.iii.
242 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
243 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-40-017 (Oct. 5, 2001)244 See infra Section IV.C.
245 See supra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 144, 228 and accompanying text.
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preventative care, it would have a greater chance of convincing a court that he care
is more personal consumption than medical procedure.
An obvious objection to the Service's position is that elective egg freezing, unlike
much preventative care, has a direct impact on structures and functions of the
woman's body. Morrissey, however, seems to confirm what prior precedent
suggested-that the Service is aiming to narrow the structure/function prong by
binding it up with a disease requirement.248 The Service could dust off its argument
in Magdalin that the structure/function prong expressly requires the presence of
disease or dysfunction.249 Then, because the woman who uses elective egg freezing
is not currently infertile, any impact on her reproductive function or her ovaries as a
structure of her body is insufficient to make the process medical care.25 0 Alterately,
the Service could take the tack it did in Morrissey and narrow the scope of the terms
"affect" or "function." To do so, the Service would draw upon the definition of
"affect" articulated by the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that a mere acceleration of the
production of eggs does not "materially influenc[e] or alter[]" her ovaries or her
reproductive function.2 51
Egg retrieval fares even worse under such a definition. Retrieving the eggs has
no lasting effect on the woman's ovaries. Nor does the retrieval obviously materially
affect the woman's reproductive function.252 Because the efficacy of egg freezing is
unclear, it may not significantly increase a woman's chances of having child.253
Further, as the number of eggs retrieved is relatively low, retrieval would not seem
to markedly decrease the woman's future reproductive capacity.25 4 Because there is
little clear precedent on the meaning of affect under § 213 and because it is, on its
surface, consistent with the fact that § 213(d) is disjunctive, the latter argument gives
the Service the space to do what it did in Morrissey: import a disease requirement
into the structure/function prong by narrowing the terms of the prong itself so as to
disallow a deduction for care it deems too driven by personal choice to be medical.25 s
Pulling elective egg freezing, particularly the egg stimulation and retrieval costs,
from the structure/function prong would require a departure from prior authority. But
much of the relevant authority is, in fact, nonbinding. The General Counsel
Memoranda in which the Service expressly stated that the structure/function prong
cannot be limited by a disease requirement is over thirty years old and, by its nature,
nonbinding.2 56 Though revenue rulings are binding upon the Service some of the
248 See supra Subsection II.C.iii.
249 See supra notes 162-169 and accompanying text.
250 Magdalin v. Comm'r., 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008).
251 Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2017).
252 Though it arguably does. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
253 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.2
5 But see Mattes v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 650 (1981), action on dec., 1982-46 (June 1, 1982), acq., 1982
C.B. 1. (focusing on the medical nature of the procedure). Mattes was decided before the addition of the
cosmetic surgery exception, so its specific holding has been overruled by statute. Its approach to drawing
the line between medical and personal expenses, however, could still be considered relevant.
255 See supra Subsection II.C.iii.
256 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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most relevant-the 1973 revenue rulings qualifying birth control, vasectomies, and
abortions as medical care under the structure/function prong257-were drafted before
the addition of the cosmetic surgery exception.25 8 Magdalin illustrated that the
Service viewed the addition of § 213(d)(9) as a signal that Congress meant to narrow
the structure/function prong.259 And though expressly arguing so seems unsupported
by the language of the exception itself, the arguments in Morrissey suggest hat the
Service persists in learning the lesson of a narrower § 213,260 whether or not that was
what Congress intended.26 1 Stated differently, it seems unlikely that the Service feels
bound by increasingly outdated and, in some cases, nonbinding authority. Further,
Magdalin and Morrissey illustrate that courts are receptive to the Service's new,
narrower construction.
Lastly, egg storage costs fare particularly poorly under post-Morrissey precedent.
As discussed above, the Service has repeatedly asserted that storage of bodily
materials does not qualify as medical care save the limited exception for short-term
storage of eggs and sperm as part of the treatment for infertility. 26 2 Storage already
has a more tenuous connection to affecting a structure or function of the body. Under
a narrower § 213, egg storage costs are easily relegated to personal consumption
status.
The arguments articulated in this Section are necessarily speculative. The Service
has not yet been presented with a claimed deduction for elective egg freezing. It is
possible that the Service would adopt either the full or partial classification approach.
If, however, Morrissey is, as this Article argues, an indicator of the Service's view
on reproductive care and its disinclination to feel bound by prior positions, elective
egg freezing is likely to be classified as nondeductible, personal care. Stated simply,
the precedent for preventative care, particularly wholly medical care, is thin and
requires significant work to build into a coherent and consistent doctrine.
C. Equity Impacts of Classification
Elective egg freezing raises a host of policy concerns, including but not limited
to how its availability will impact family formation, gender roles, women's equality,
and employer/employee relations. Each of these topics could be the subject of its
own paper-and many have already been explored2 63-but this Section focuses on a
narrower equity concern: how the Service's chosen classification will differentially
impact women because of that classification's interactions with other code
provisions and the concept of income itself.
257 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
258 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(9) (2012).259 See Magdalin v. Comm'r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008).
260 See supra Subsection II.C.iii.
261 The cosmetic surgery exception is, by its terms, limited to surgery targeted at one's appearance
and unprompted by a condition or injury. 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(9) (2012).
262 See supra Subsection 1I1.A.ii.
263 See sources cited supra note 66.
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Academics who have studied the role of reproductive technologies on family
formation have highlighted the fact that such technologies, and the family planning
they enable, are frequently the purview of financially secure individuals.21 If the
Service attempts to and succeeds in classifying elective egg freezing as a
nondeductible personal expense, its decision could further restrict reproductive
choice. For the individual who pays for elective egg freezing out of her own pocket,
classifying elective egg freezing as a nondeductible personal expense forecloses
deductibility under § 213. Even a woman whose employer provides an elective egg
freezing benefit may fare only marginally better than the woman who pays her own
expenses. If an employer structures the benefit as a reimbursement program, such as
an HRA, the reimbursement is only excludable from gross income if the cost would
be deductible as medical care under § 213 .265 If not, the reimbursement remains
taxable compensation. If instead the employer structures the benefit as covered care
under an employer-provided group health plan, 266 but caps that coverage at a
particular dollar amount, the woman who receives such a benefit will have, at best,
a partial subsidy, as any amount she pays out of pocket remains nondeductible under
§ 213.267 Thus, if elective egg freezing fails to qualify as medical care under § 213,
the only individuals who are likely to receive a full subsidy for such care are those
whose employers provide uncapped coverage of elective egg freezing under an
ERISA-qualified plan that is excluded from the employee's income (and does not
come onto the return as an itemized deduction).268 Most importantly, even if elective
egg freezing qualifies as medical care, any employer-provided coverage is likely
limited to higher-income individuals, 269 a fact that only exacerbates existing
inequities in access to healthcare broadly and reproductive care specifically.
264 See generally Carbone & Cahn, supra note 66.
265 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 105(b), 106(f) (2012); I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-2 C.B. 93. For relevant rules
for other arrangements, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 125(f), 223(d)(2)(a) (2012).
266 29 U.S.C. § 1167(1) (2012), defines group health plan with reference to the definition ofmedical care under
§ 213. The strength of influence of the Code on qualified plans is, however, unclear. See Health and Welfare Plans,
4 Emp. Benefit Plans & Issues for Small Employers (BNA) (2018) ("Like many other aspects of employee benefit
plans, the interaction of tax attributes under the I.R.C. and mandates placed on the employer under ERISA is quite
fuzzy. Technically, there is no definition of a group health plan under the I.R.C., and the only definition is found in
ERISA; however, the ERISA definition contains
cross-references to I.RC. sections.").
2 67
Ptal because Treas. Reg. § 1.105-2 (2017) clarifies that reimbursement includes payments made, by the
employer or by an insurance company, to the care provider, meaning the §213(e) definition ofmedical care applies
to such payments. If however, the Service failed to detect (likely) or challenged the care within the context of an
already ERISA-approved employer provided plan, the partial subsidy could remain. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 105(b), 106(g)
(2012); Rev. Rul. 2005-24,2005-1 C.B. 892.
26
8 See The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11027, 113 Stat 2054,2077 (2017) (granting
greater standard deduction until 2026). There is some evidence that women may receive the finds necessary to
pursue elective egg freezing as gifts from family. In such cases, the woman maybe more likely to have the liquidity
to purchase the services while also having an AGI low enough that getting over the §213 threshold is likely. La
Ferla, supra note 22 (noting that parents or grandparents may gift the funds necessary to pay for elective egg freezing).
269 See Josh Iselin & Philip Stallworth, Who Benefits from Health-Care Related Tax Expenditures?,
TAx POL'Y CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/who-benefits-health-care-related-tax-
expenditures [https://perma.cc/238G-MY2S]; supra Subsection I.A.i.
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Consider two hypothetical taxpayers. Jennifer works for Facebook which
structures its elective egg freezing benefit as coverage under its health insurance plan
but caps the maximum payout at $20,000. In contrast, Aria's employer provides no
elective egg freezing coverage, so Aria pays all associated costs out of pocket.
Assume both Jennifer and Aria's care cost $35,000 and both have adjusted gross
income of $75,000. Jennifer, however, has economic income of $95,000 because of
the value of her employer-provided benefit. Under § 213, Jennifer can deduct $9,375
of her out of pocket costs, a deduction that saves her $2,344 in federal income tax.270
Aria, in contrast, can deduct $29,375 of her $35,000 in out of pocket costs, resulting
in a tax savings of $7,343.271 Though Aria's tax savings are higher her after-tax cost
is also greater. After the dust settles, Jennifer has spent only $12,656 while Aria
has spent $27,657. This example illustrates the comparatively lower value of
the medical expense deduction as compared to an exclusion from income of an
employer-provided benefit. This problem is not unique to elective egg freezing, but
it is a potentially troubling example of tax law failing to properly identify similarly
and differently-situated taxpayers.
IV. INCUBATING ARGUMENTS: ELECTIVE EGG FREEZING AND THE FUTURE OF THE
MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION
Having analyzed elective egg freezing under §213 and identified the doctrinal
weaknesses it lays bare, this Part moves beyond considering elective egg freezing in
isolation. How the Service applies § 213 to elective egg freezing and, if contested,
how a court rules, could set precedent that alters the scope of § 213 and influences
the tax treatment of emergent medical technologies. This Part explores the impacts
of the Service's potential rulings and, in doing so, reinforces the need for the Service
to carefully consider its characterization of elective egg freezing and revisit its
understanding of preventative care and the role of choice in tax.
A. Scope of§ 213 and Medical Care
Were the Service to classify elective egg freezing (in whole or part) as medical
care, it would signal a retreat from the views advanced in Morrissey and the cases
that preceded it. Recall that if elective egg freezing qualifies as medical care, it likely
does so via the structure/function prong.272 Allowing a deduction for the costs would,
then, affirm that the medical care definition should be read as disjunctive; that an
expense need only satisfy one or the other prong to qualify as medical care. Doing
so would also suggest that the Service does not view all reproductive care as
inherently personal consumption. If care hedging against future infertility is
deductible, then care provided to have a child cannot be wholly personal consumption.
Where allowance of a deduction would at the least maintain the current scope of
§ 213 and, at best, signal a modest expansion, disallowance would move precedent
270 $15,000 paid less 7.5% of her AGI at a 25% marginal rate.
271 $35,000 paid less 7.5% of her AGI at a 25% marginal rate.
272 See supra Subsection III.A.i.
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toward a narrower § 213. The Service has three basic arguments to deny a deduction
for elective egg freezing costs: (1) that all reproductive care is nonmedical, personal
consumption, (2) that elective egg freezing is preventative care that is not wholly
medical and that benefits only the general health of the taxpayer, or (3) that the care
does not affect a structure or function of the woman's body. 27 3 As discussed above,
each position requires the Service to retreat from prior, more expansive
understandings of the scope of § 213 .274 Both Magdalin and Morrissey represent
such moves. A similar decision on elective egg freezing would bolster the narrowing
trend.
B. Defining the Baseline Taxpayer
Determining what qualifies as a disease, disorder, or condition requires
establishing a baseline. For a physical or mental state to be abnormal we must know
what it means to be normal. The boundaries of the baseline healthy individual are
not clearly-defined by § 213, but either full or partial classification of elective egg
freezing as medical care could help clarify the concept. Elective egg freezing, if
successful, counteracts natural, age-related infertility, in so far as it removes the
undesired impact of infertility by artificially extending it. Consider the woman who
successfully uses her frozen eggs to have a child at fifty-five. To do so, she would
utilize IVF. Morrissey and Magdalin strongly suggest that such care qualifies as
medical only if it follows a diagnosis of infertility.275 At forty-five, an overwhelming
majority of women are unable to have a child without intervention276 but the question
arises whether that inability is a disease or simply a normal consequence of aging.
By increasing the possibility of women getting pregnant later in life,277 elective egg
freezing may push the Service to decide if baseline health is relative or fixed. Stated
differently, if the Service views the woman's use of her frozen eggs and IVF at
fifty-five as treatment for infertility, it implies that the baseline is reproductive age.
If and when medical advances enable significant delay or reversal of the aging
process, knowing the bounds of the baseline could influence whether policymakers
consider a deduction appropriate.2 78 Categorizing elective egg freezing under § 213
plays a role in this discussion.
273 See supra Section 11I.B.
274 See supra Section III.B.
275 See infra Section II.C.
276 See Jean M. Twenge, How Long Can You Wait to Have a Baby?, ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/07/how-long-can-you-wait-to-have-a-baby/309374/
[https://perma.cc/3U7J-KH8V].
277 IVF already allows this, and elective egg freezing may increase the likelihood because its express
goal is to buy time.
278 See Pratt, supra note 7 at 1125 (discussing Professor Joseph Dodge's opinion on age-related
changes under §213).
2018-2019 417
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
C. The Future ofPreventative Care
Elective egg freezing is, at its core, highly-medicalized preventative care.
Because elective egg freezing is readily identifiable as medical and because of its
impact on the woman's body, the costs should qualify as medical care. The Service,
however, seems likely to argue that such care is nondeductible, personal
consumption. It may rely upon the weakness of relevant precedent. Or it may utilize
the rhetoric of choice. Or it may combine the two-casting the care as too
speculative, too tied to lifestyle choices to fit within §213. Describing some
preventative care such as dance lessons or a gym membership as "merely beneficial
to the general health of an individual"279 and therefore nondeductible, is unsurprising
and appropriate as a matter of policy. 280 Regular exercise may prevent the
development of a wide-range of diseases such as diabetes, cardiovascular disease, or
Alzheimer's, and it may even affect a structure or function of the body, but it is
settled precedent that such costs are nondeductible, personal consumption.281 But
emerging medical technologies suggest that future preventative care may be readily
identifiable as medical, similar to elective egg freezing. They may also, like elective
egg freezing, be separated by time or probability from the conditions they prevent.
This section considers two forms of preventative care-prophylactic surgery and
CRISPR-Cas9 gene therapy-detailing how both put new pressure on the scope of
preventative care under § 213 and underscore the potentially wide-ranging impacts
of the Service's chosen approach to categorizing elective egg freezing.
i. Prophylactic Surgery
A prophylactic mastectomy is a surgery sometimes performed as means of
attempting to prevent the development of breast cancer.282 Specifically, the surgery
279 See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(4)(ii) (2014).
280 Allowing such costs would represent a significant preference for a particular type of consumption
and would stand in stark conflict with 26 U.S.C. § 262 (2012).
281 IRS, PUB. 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 2 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V65-XXHR]; see also Thoene v. Comm'r, 33 T.C. 62, 65 (1959) ("It is
not at all unusual for doctors to recommend to a patient a course of personal conduct and personal activity
which, if pursued, will result in health benefits to the patient, but the expenses therefor are generally to be
considered ordinary personal expenses. There may be rare situations when such expenses would lose their
identity as ordinary personal expenses and become properly classified as medical care expenses, but this
record does not present such a case.").
282 Prophylactic removal of a woman's uterus and fallopian tubes may also be performed. The
surgery gained widespread attention when actress Angelina Jolie revealed that she had undergone
the surgery absent a breast cancer diagnosis but because of her family history and the fact that she
carried the BRCAI gene. See Angelina Jolie, My Medical Choice, N.Y. TIMES (May 14,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/my-medical-choice.html?src-me&ref-general
[https://perma.cc/J3C4-F5NM]; Stephanie Watson, Angelina Jolie's Prophylactic Mastectomy
a Difficult Decision, HARV. HEALTH BLOG (May 15, 2013, 11:50 AM),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/angelina-jolies-prophylactic-mastectomy-a-difficult-
decision-201305156255 [https://perma.cc/C2HR-JTKV].
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involves removing one or both breasts when the breasts are still healthy.283 The
surgery may be performed in one of three contexts: (1) when a woman has genetic
testing which reveals she carries the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes and other risk factors,
but no breast cancer diagnosis; (2) when she has the gene(s) and a breast cancer
diagnosis in one breast (contralateral prophylactic mastectomy); or (3) when she
does not have the gene but has a breast cancer diagnosis in one breast (contralateral
prophylactic mastectomy).2 8 When the surgery is performed in the second scenario,
the cost of care should easily satisfy § 213, as it is part of the treatment of the
diagnosed breast cancer.285 But were the Service to succeed in categorizing elective
egg freezing as nonmedical, the categorizations of (1) and (3) become less clear.
At first glance, either scenario (1) or (3) should satisfy the structure/function
prong of § 213. A mastectomy affects a structure of the woman's body and is not, in
this context, motivated by a desired change in appearance.286 But if the Service
narrows the structure/function prong to effectively require the presence of disease as
a co-requirement, the deductibility of both scenarios (1) and (3) becomes more
tenuous.
A woman with a family history of breast cancer and/or the BRCA1 or 2 genes
has a significantly higher chance of developing breast cancer than does a woman
without such risk factors.287 Assume, arguendo, that because the risk of developing-
breast cancer is so high for the woman in scenario (1), that the Service feels
compelled or inclined to construe the surgery as treatment.288 It is not clear that
scenario (3) could be categorized as treatment under a narrower § 213, however.
283 Oluwadamilola Motunaryo Fayanju et al., Contralateral Prophylactic Mastectomy After
Unilateral Breast Cancer: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 260 ANNALS SURGERY 1000(2014);
Timothy R. Rebbeck et al., Bilateral Prophylactic Mastectomy Reduces Breast Cancer Risk in BRCA I
and BRCA2 Mutation Carriers: The PROSE Study Group, 22 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1055 (2004);
Preventive (Prophylactic) Mastectomy: Surgery to Reduce Breast Cancer Risk, MAYO CLINIC (Sep. 29,
2016), https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/mastectomy/in-depth/prophylactic-mastectomy/art-
20047221 [https://perma.cc/XAE4-JS9G].
284 See Michaela S. Tracy et al., Contralateral Prophylactic Mastectomy in Women with Breast
Cancer: Trends, Predictors, and Areas for Future Research, 140 BREAST CANCER RES. & TREATMENT
447,447-49 (2013).
285 Such care would likely be covered, at least in part, by insurance.
286 See 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(9) (2012) ("Cosmetic surgery.-(A)In general.-The term 'medical care'
does not include cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures, unless the surgery or procedure is necessary
to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury
resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease. (B)Cosmetic surgery defined.-For purposes
of this paragraph, the term "cosmetic surgery" means any procedure which is directed at improving the
patient's appearance and does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the body or prevent or
treat illness or disease.").
2" Data are somewhat conflicting but it appears that greater than 50% of women with these risk
factors develop breast cancer at some point in their lives. BRCA Mutations: Cancer Risk and Genetic
Testing, NAT'L CANCER INST. (January 30, 2018), https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-
prevention/genetics/brca-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/S5K9-3XTD].
288 Note that the likelihood of developing the disease should not matter where the care is wholly
medical. However, it is reasonable to assume that the Service might view scenario (1) as a compelling,
sympathetic case and therefore be more inclined to allow a deduction even if such care could be disallowed
under a narrower § 213.
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Though the woman in scenario (3) has a breast cancer diagnosis in one breast, her
risk of developing cancer in the other breast is at or less than 1%, absent other risk
factors.289 Further, data on the women who pursue the preventative surgery in this
context "suggests that patient characteristics, such as age and education status, are
stronger predictors of [the surgery] than tumor factors."2" Indeed, a recent report
stated that "women may opt for [the surgery] for psychological rather than clinical
indications," citing a survey study that found that "95% of [scenario (3)] patients
reported 'desire for peace of mind' as an extremely or very important reason for
choosing" to have the surgery performed.291
Armed with these facts and favorable precedent from its prior disallowance of a
deduction for elective egg freezing, the Service could argue for similar treatment for
the woman in scenario (3). Though the care is preventative, the Service might
concede, the fact that the risk of breast cancer is low, and that the woman's
motivation was "peace of mind" makes clear that the care was more for her general
health and wellbeing than is required for care to be medical.292 To allow a deduction
would, the Service would argue, subsidize an unnecessary surgery already utilized
more heavily by a limited set of women. While it is accurate that surgery is listed in
the regulations as medical care, the Service would assert that preventative surgery is
distinct from surgery to treat a condition. It would reiterate the limiting language in
the regulations that pulls from medical care "an expenditure which is merely
beneficial to the general health of an individual."293 The Service would, then, import
factors from preventative care precedent-imminent probability of disease, the
taxpayer's motivation, etc. 294 -that should not apply when the care is wholly
medical. And if it had successfully done so in its characterization of elective egg
freezing, the Service could bolster its argument with such precedent.
Because the precedent on preventative care does not address care such as
prophylactic surgery or elective egg freezing-care that is readily identifiable as
medical, but which prevents conditions that could develop long after the care is
provided-there is space for the Service to argue for a more restrictive § 213 if it
chooses. Intuition suggests that if the prophylactic surgery scenario came in
front of the Service before elective egg freezing, it might take a more
taxpayer-favorable position on the classification of such care. Because the care is not
for reproduction-a disfavored category of care that the Service views as wholly
personal29 5-the Service might be less skeptical and more inclined to permit a
deduction. Stated differently, the social context of the care matters. But it is precisely
that element of chance that makes considering how elective egg freezing should be
treated so important and makes clear the need to better define preventative care.
289 Tracy et al., supra note 284, at 448.
290 Id. at 447.
291 Id. at 448.
292 See supra Section III.B (regarding how the Service might import the preventative care factors into
even wholly medical care).
293 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (2014).
294 See supra notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
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Precedent on the tax treatment of highly-medicalized preventative care should not be
unnecessarily narrowed because the Service views reproduction as a consumption
decision, but rather should be the result of reasoned consideration of how such care
fits within the § 213 framework.296
ii. CRISPR-Cas9 Gene Editing
Whereas prophylactic surgery is already part of medical practice,
CRISPR-Cas9 (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats) is a
novel medical technology.297 CRISPR-Cas9 is a means of editing DNA derived from
bacterial immune systems that essentially enables scientists to make precise and
stable changes to an individual's genome.298 CRISPR-Cas9 is part of a trend in
research to develop what is known as precision medicine-highly individualized
care.299 Though not yet approved for use, the technology successfully repaired a
genetic mutation in human embryos in a research context. " Stated simply,
CRISPR-Cas9 may revolutionize both therapeutic and preventative care.
CRISPR-Cas9, like elective egg freezing and prophylactic surgery, tests the
scope of § 213. Consider an example drawn from actual requests for the techiiology.
A lead developer of the gene editing process reports that she has already been
contacted by women wondering if CRISPR-Cas9 can prevent the passage of the
BRCA genes to their children by editing their embryos' DNA.30' The regulations for
§ 213 would only permit a deduction for the medical care of the child if the child
qualified as a dependent either at the time the care was provided or when the
expenses were paid.302 This restriction provides the ready, but wholly uninteresting
296 How insurance companies treat or are likely to treat such care is also important. The ACA
expanded required coverage for preventative care. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012). Interestingly, in
April 2018, the Service issued Notice 2018-12, holding that vasectomies do not meet the § 223 definition
of preventive care. I.R.S. Notice 2018-12, 2018-12 I.R.B. 441. Though it doesn't bear directly on the §
213 analysis, it is a timely example of the Service struggling with the scope of preventative care. See I.R.S.
Notice 2004-23, 2004-15 I.R.B. 725 (stating that "preventive care does not generally include any service
or benefit intended to treat an existing illness, injury, or condition").
297 Jennifer Kahn, The Crispr Quandary, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/magazine/the-crispr-quandary.html [https://perma.cc/S5F8-
EM5H].
298 See Rajat M. Gupta & Kiran Musunuru, Expanding the Genetic Editing Tool Kit: ZFNs, TALENs,
and CRISPR-Cas9, 124 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 4154,4156 (2014).
299 See generally J. Larry Jameson & Dan L. Longo, Precision Medicine-Personalized, Problematic,
and Promising, 70 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURV. 612 (2015).
" Pam Belluck, In Breakthrough, Scientists Edit a Dangerous Mutation from Genes in Human
Embryos, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/science/gene-editing-
human-embryos.html [https://perma.cc/RRZ7-TCVD].
301 See id.
302 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(3) (2014) ("Status as spouse or dependent. In the case of medical
expenses for the care of a person who is the taxpayer's spouse or dependent, the deduction under section
213 is allowable if the status of such person as 'spouse' or 'dependent' of the taxpayer exists either at the
time the medical services were rendered or at the time the expenses were paid."); see also Kilpatrick v.
Comm'r, 68 T.C. 469, 473 n.4 (1977).
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answer, to whether gene editing of an embryo qualifies as medical care: no. To
address the fascinating question of whether gene editing could qualify as medical
care, this discussion sets aside that restriction. And because gene editing can be used
as care for already living persons, the question remains relevant.
Gene editing could give rise to at least three types of medical care: (1) treatment
of a current disease, (2) prevention of a disease, and (3) selection of traits.303 Under
pre-Morrissey precedent, there is an argument hat all three meet the § 213 definition
of medical care. Assume an individual is diagnosed with cancer and CRISPR-Cas9
can edit the genes of her immune cells to empower them to combat the cancer.
The use of CRISPR-Cas9 on these facts should readily satisfy the disease prong of §
213. Classifying the second use of CRISPR-Cas9 technology-prevention of a
disease-is more challenging.
Recall from prior discussion that the Service has shown that when care is
preventative, it considers the likely efficacy of the care in determining whether it
qualifies as medical care.30s Not unlike the prophylactic surgery in scenario (3),
CRISPR-Cas9 could be used to edit genes to prevent the development of a disease
that the individual has a low probability of developing. Herein, the precedent the
Service may set with elective egg freezing would be relevant. Elective egg freezing
targets a condition-infertility-of the highest possible probability. Were the
Service to disallow a deduction for elective egg freezing by appealing to the
"imminent probability" standard, for example, the use of gene editing (or
prophylactic surgery) to prevent development of a disease or condition with lower
probability seems even less likely to qualify as medical care. The potential response
to this assertion-that gene editing affects a structure or function of the
body-segues into considering the last possible use of gene therapy: trait selection.
Trait selection is a complex and controversial potential application of gene
editing. Scientists emphasize that the type of traits that parents are likely to
select-hair or eye color,3" intelligence, etc.-are controlled by many genes and
therefore difficult to engineer. 307 Nevertheless, CRISPR-Cas9 brings medical
technology one step closer to the possibility of trait selection. And assuming such
care would not be covered by insurance and would be costly, an individual may
attempt to deduct the costs of that care.3 0s In the absence of a disease to treat or
303 See Kahn, supra note 297.
30 Such care is a focus of gene editing and the growing field of precision medicine of which it is a
part. See Researchers Use CRISPR Gene-Editing Tool to Help Turn Immune Cells Against Tumors,
NAT'L CANCER INST. (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.cancer.gov/news-events/cancer-currents-
blog/2017/crispr-immunotherapy [https://perma.cc/M548-LZSK].
30 See supra notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
306 Trait selection should fall under the cosmetic surgery exception, though it also implicates human
capital analysis. 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(9) (2012).
307 Pam Belluck, Gene Editing for 'Designer Babies'?Highly Unlikely, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/science/gene-editing-embryos-designer-
babies.html [https://perma.cc/4TSG-6UQP].
30s Id. ( "'Allowing any form of human germline modification leaves the way open for all
kinds - especially when fertility clinics start offering 'genetic upgrades' to those able to afford them,"'
Marcy Darnovsky, executive director of the Center for Genetics and Society, said in a statement. "'We
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prevent, gene editing for trait selection would have to qualify as medical care under
the structure/function prong. That fact, in turn, raises many questions including: Is
the gene the relevant structure that gene editing affects, or should it be construed to
be the bodily structure or function which the gene (or genes) influence? Answering
that question is essential to determining whether the editing affects a
structure/function within the meaning of § 213. 30 Also influential would be
precedent on what constitutes an affect-precedent that the Service's decision on
elective egg freezing may significantly shape.
If the gene is the relevant structure, is its modification significant enough to
qualify as affecting a structure of the body? If instead the relevant structure or
function is that which the gene influences, the argument for an effect is stronger.
Enabling an individual's body to produce more of a hormone that boosts muscle
capacity (a possible application of CRISPR-Cas9) by editing a gene produces a
change upon the individual's bodily function of producing hormones.3 i0 Stated
differently, precedent on what qualifies as a structure, function, and/or affect
influences the materiality of the argued affect itself. While how § 213 would or
should apply to gene editing is not clear, the precedent he Service may set when it
considers elective egg freezing will loom large.
If instead the Service continues to push to read a disease requirement into the
structure/function prong, it could take the position that gene editing outside the
treatment context is wholly personal consumption, even if it affects a structure or
function of the body. Importantly, the Service would have many persuasive policy
arguments with which to support its argument. Emerging technologies such as gene
therapy and the highly-medicalized preventative care of elective egg freezing, and
prophylactic surgery are expensive. To the extent such care is not covered by
insurance"' (which is more likely, the more preventative the care), individuals do
and will face high out of pocket costs.312 The high costs, particularly if no subsidy is
available, give rise to equity concerns. Meaningful differences in access to and
uptake of care that could be construed as medical, inject such care with a greater
consumption element.313 The Service could marshal such arguments to support its
could all too easily find ourselves in a world where some people's children are considered biologically
superior to the rest of us."')
' There is an analogy here to the regulations for §263 that provide guidance on determining the
relevant unit of property as a step in determining the materiality of a change to such property. See 26
CFR 1.263-3(e).
.o See Belluck, supra note 307.
311 See Preventative Surgery: Prophylactic Mastectomy, SUSAN G. KOMEN (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://ww5.komen.org/BreastCancer/PreventiveSurgery.html [https://perma.cc/U4JT-7JB6] ("At this
time, no federal laws require insurance providers to cover prophylactic mastectomy. Some state laws
require coverage for prophylactic mastectomy, but coverage varies state to state. It's best to check with
your insurance provider to learn about your plan's coverage.").
312 The costs of elective egg freezing were addressed. See supra notes 36-40 and
accompanying text. Costs of prophylactic mastectomy are difficult to determine but it is safe to
assume they exceed $15,000. See K. Fanuko, Preventive Mastectomies Benefit a Select Few,
CONSUMERS DiG. (June 10, 2013), http://www.consumersdigest.com/news/preventive-
mastectomies-benefit-a-select-few [https://perma.cc/BZP4-3SAZ].
313 See generally Andrews, supra note 91; Colliton, supra note 161.
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position that any of the technologies discussed in this Article or similar ones in
development run afoul of § 262. Stated differently, that highly-medicalized
preventative care may be medical in nature, but it is personal in tax.
CONCLUSION
At first blush, defining the boundaries of a deduction for medical care
appears uncomplicated. One should be sure to include care that just seems
medical-provided by a physician or other skilled care provider, performed in a
hospital, involving scalpels, prescription drugs, respirators, and the like. Including
care aimed at diagnosing, preventing, treating, or lessening the impact of a condition
strikes one as appropriate as well. After all, an individual does not elect to receive
such care in the same way she elects to travel to Paris. And despite the fact that both
decisions can be viewed as personal-they both provide a personal benefit-because
such care can be distinguished from the vacation, an argument can be made for
subsidizing it without risk of violating the Code's restriction on deducting personal
expenses. In many instances, the definition of medical care in § 213 works without
issue. Elective egg freezing is not one of those instances.
As an amalgamation of preventative and fertility care, elective egg freezing
challenges the scope of § 213. Because it seems medical, unlike much of the
preventative care which has been tested under the medical care definition, it does not
fit well within such precedent. Because it is also bound up with fertility, it implicates
a growing body of authority that seems to narrow the scope of § 213 beyond what its
language would require. Both aspects of elective egg freezing make it challenging to
classify and the recent case of Morrissey v. United States suggests that the Service
may aim to categorize the process as wholly personal/nonmedical consumption. And
analyzing elective egg freezing under § 213 exposes the cracks in the doctrine-a
superficial understanding of preventative care and the role of choice in § 213.
Yet how the Service rules on elective egg freezing could influence the tax
treatment of emerging medical technologies that share its characteristics: seemingly
medical intervention motivated by concern for the eventual onset of a given
condition that is either unlikely to develop in the near future or may not ever
develop. Medicine is shifting toward developing such similarly if not more
highly-medicalized preventative care--gene editing that reduces or eliminates your
risk of developing a given condition-and how the Service rules on elective egg
freezing will lay a foundation that influences the tax treatment of such care. Or even
if the test case of elective egg freezing does not arise, other emergent technologies
will face the challenges of an uncertain and unclear § 213. Considering elective egg
freezing and the medical care definition allows us to address the doctrinal and policy
concerns that such technology presents before issues arise, providing, therein, the
best chance of advancing § 213 in a way that is consistent, coherent, and fair.
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